Makefile MCP

Name: Makefile MCP
Author: ai-ronin-systems

@ai-ronin-systemsMCP server · External

Expose trusted GNU Make targets as governed MCP tools without a generic shell.

AI agent governancev0.2.2Apache-2.0Python

Freeno charge per call

How to install

Runs on your machine from its package; the steps are below.

What it does

Reads
Writes
High impact

At most: moves money, runs code or commands, deletes data, or sends messages for you.

What it costs

Free

Odel charges nothing per call. The publisher may charge for its own service.

Runs locally over stdio

This server isn't hosted — your MCP client launches it from a package registry. Use one of the commands below, or drop the config into your client (e.g. Claude Desktop).

PyPImakefile-mcpv0.2.2

Run

uvx makefile-mcp

MCP client config

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "makefile-mcp": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "makefile-mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

README6 min readView on GitHub

Expose trusted GNU Make targets to AI agents — without exposing a generic shell or replacing Make with another workflow system.

Makefile MCP turns an existing Makefile into typed MCP tools. It is zero-config and run-safe by default, and deny-by-default when governed.

text

Makefile  →  Makefile MCP  →  Codex / Claude / LangChain / Cursor / VS Code / MCP client

Threat model

Protected	Not protected
Agents cannot run arbitrary shell commands, only exposed Make targets.	A malicious or buggy Makefile: recipes are trusted code, not sandboxed.
Without config, agents can only run `test`, `lint`, `check`, and `fmt`.	A target the operator chose to expose doing something destructive.
Governed mode runs only allow-listed `(context, target)` pairs with typed, validated inputs.	Host or container privileges granted outside Makefile MCP.
`dangerous` tasks need explicit human approval through the MCP client; no approval, no run.	An MCP client that auto-approves elicitation without a human.
Every governed run attempt, including approval refusals, can be written to an audit log, with secret inputs masked.	Secrets a recipe prints in ways that differ from the input value.

Details: SECURITY.md and docs/security.md.

Quick start

bash

pipx install makefile-mcp        # or: uv tool install makefile-mcp
makefile-mcp serve

Given:

make

test: ## Run tests
	pytest -q

lint: ## Run lint
	ruff check .

Makefile MCP exposes make_test and make_lint as MCP tools. Other targets are listed but not runnable until you govern them.

bash

makefile-mcp list
makefile-mcp doctor
makefile-mcp run test
makefile-mcp run test --preview   # GNU Make --dry-run; not a sandbox

One-shot use: uvx makefile-mcp serve.

Why Makefile MCP

Makefile MCP is intentionally narrow: the repository's Makefile remains the executable source of truth, while Makefile MCP supplies a governed agent-facing capability boundary.

Principle	What it means
Make stays authoritative	No duplicate workflow DSL, plugin command language, scheduler, database, or second execution engine.
No generic shell capability	Agents invoke discovered or explicitly governed Make targets, not arbitrary host commands.
Trusted Makefile, untrusted invocation	Repository automation is trusted; caller-selected tasks and declared values are authorized, validated, and bounded. GNU Make's own variable/function semantics are treated as an interpreter boundary.
One execution path	CLI, direct MCP tools, generic MCP tools, preview, contexts, and capabilities share the same catalog, authorization, validation, and executor.
Conservative discovery	Makefile MCP statically exposes only Make syntax it can classify confidently; ambiguous constructs are omitted rather than guessed.
Bounded Unix runtime	Foreground execution has bounded input/output, timeout/cancellation cleanup, stdin isolation, process-group handling, and physical-context locking.

See Design rationale for the full capability/property map and the alternatives deliberately left out.

Architecture

text

                         Makefile
                            |
                    conservative catalog
                            |
              +-------------+-------------+
              |                           |
            auto                       governed
         no config                   .makefile-mcp.yaml
              |                           |
              +-------------+-------------+
                            |
                       Application
                  +---------+---------+
                  |                   |
              MCP direct         MCP generic
                  +---------+---------+
                            |
                         Executor
                            |
                      exact `make -f`

One catalog. One execution path. Thin CLI and MCP adapters.

See Architecture.

Governed mode

Without .makefile-mcp.yaml, Makefile MCP runs in auto mode: every conservatively discovered root target is listed, but only test, lint, check, and fmt can run, with no caller-controlled Make variables. --legacy-auto-run restores the old run-everything behavior (deprecated).

Add .makefile-mcp.yaml to switch to explicit governance:

yaml

schema_version: 1

contexts:
  backend:
    directory: backend

tasks:
  test:
    contexts: [root, backend]
    risk: safe

  deploy:
    risk: dangerous
    variables:
      ENV:
        type: enum
        values: [staging, production]
        required: true

capabilities:
  verify: test

audit:
  path: .makefile-mcp/audit.jsonl

Only enabled (context, target) pairs are callable. dangerous tasks additionally need human approval (defaults.require_approval), and audit writes one JSON line per call. See Governed mode, Configuration, and Contexts and capabilities.

MCP presentations

Makefile MCP supports three MCP presentations over the same callable catalog. Choose the presentation that best fits your requirements.

bash

makefile-mcp serve --tools direct    # default: one typed tool per callable target
makefile-mcp serve --tools generic   # list_tasks / describe_task / run_task
makefile-mcp serve --tools both      # both views, same execution core

See MCP presentations and client setup.

Security

Makefile MCP assumes the repository, Makefiles, included Make code, wrapper scripts, and provisioned tools are trusted operator-controlled code. The security boundary is the invocation: an MCP/CLI caller chooses an exposed task/context and, in governed mode, supplies declared values. Makefile MCP authorizes and validates that request; it does not sandbox hostile Makefiles.

Runtime bounds, cancellation/process-group cleanup, stdin isolation, and locking are primarily execution-correctness properties. They limit failure modes around trusted automation rather than turning Make into a sandbox. The built-in MCP server is stdio-only: no HTTP listener, remote-auth layer, TLS, tenancy, or network-service lifecycle is hidden inside the product.

See SECURITY.md for the security policy, reporting process, trust boundary, and limitations. Detailed implementation notes are in docs/security.md.

Intentional scope limits

GNU Make on Linux/macOS; Windows is not currently supported.
Trusted repository assumption: Makefiles, includes, scripts, and provisioned tools are operator-controlled code.
Static discovery is deliberately conservative, not a complete GNU Make parser.
Preview is GNU Make dry-run, not sandboxing; Make evaluation can still have side effects.
Direct tool inventory is registered at startup; generic catalog calls can observe supported Makefile changes.
.makefile-mcp.yaml is startup policy; changes require restart and fail closed until then.
Foreground/bounded tasks only; deliberately detached daemons are outside Makefile MCP's process-group containment model.
No HTTP server, auth stack, scheduler, job queue, workflow persistence, plugin execution framework, or arbitrary shell tool.
Reload behavior:
- .makefile-mcp.yaml is startup policy. Restart Makefile MCP after adding, removing, or editing it.
- Makefile discovery refreshes when the conventional Makefile or tracked literal includes change.
- Generic calls see the refreshed catalog immediately.
- Direct tool inventory is a startup snapshot: adding or removing direct tools requires a restart. Existing direct tools still re-check the live catalog when invoked.

Requirements

Python 3.11+ · GNU Make · Linux or macOS

Documentation

Architecture — runtime flow, responsibilities, lifecycle, invariants, and dependency rules.
Design rationale — key tradeoffs, full product-property map, and deliberately rejected alternatives.
CLI reference — commands, options, result model, root detection, and exit codes.
Configuration — authoritative .makefile-mcp.yaml fields, defaults, approval, audit log, and precedence.
Static Make discovery — supported syntax, fail-closed behavior, includes, limitations, and cache semantics.
Governed mode — explicit exposure, typed inputs, risk metadata, human approval, and operating model.
MCP presentations — direct, generic, both, schemas, result/error semantics, naming, and lifecycle.
Contexts and capabilities — monorepo scoping, (context, target) authorization, and semantic mappings.
MCP client setup — Codex, Claude Code, LangChain/LangGraph, Cursor, VS Code, and uvx examples.
Security — trust boundary, Make input safety, arbitrary strings, discovery, environment/path controls, and execution bounds.
Development — contributor workflows, code ownership, regression expectations, and Definition of Done.
Deployment — Docker/stdio deployment, production checklist, and provisioning custom tools plus Makefiles.
Releasing — version/tag contract, clean-package smoke test, PyPI Trusted Publishing, provenance, GitHub Releases, and MCP Registry metadata.

Security reporting: SECURITY.md. Contributing: CONTRIBUTING.md.

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