Proxmox MCP server
Simple Proxmox MCP
MCP server for managing Proxmox VE
50 tools — nodes, QEMU VMs, LXC containers, storage, cluster, snapshots.
Why this one?
- One image, multi-arch —
docker run ghcr.io/akmalovaa/proxmox-mcp:latestand you're done - Just env vars — no config files, no database, no state
- Read-only by default — destructive ops are gated behind an explicit
PROXMOX_RISK_LEVEL - stdio or Streamable HTTP — one env var apart; stdio by default, HTTP binds loopback
- Tiny codebase — a thin layer over Proxmoxer, no config files, no database, no state
- Raw JSON out — no formatting, no emoji; LLM gets clean data
- Readable failures — a 403, a dead host or a blocked tier come back as a sentence, not a stack trace
Quick start
Image: ghcr.io/akmalovaa/proxmox-mcp:latest (multi-arch: amd64 + arm64).
1. Export credentials in your shell profile (~/.zprofile, ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc):
# token auth (recommended — see "Least privilege" for the user and role to give it):
export PROXMOX_HOST=192.168.1.100
export PROXMOX_USER=mcp@pve
export PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME=mcp
export PROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
# or password auth:
# export PROXMOX_USER=root@pam
# export PROXMOX_PASSWORD=your-password
# optional:
export PROXMOX_RISK_LEVEL=read
Reload: source ~/.zprofile (or restart the shell).
2. Add to ~/.claude/settings.json (Claude Code) or claude_desktop_config.json (Claude Desktop):
{
"mcpServers": {
"proxmox": {
"command": "docker",
"args": ["run", "-i", "--rm",
"-e", "PROXMOX_HOST",
"-e", "PROXMOX_USER",
"-e", "PROXMOX_PASSWORD",
"ghcr.io/akmalovaa/proxmox-mcp:latest"]
}
}
}
or token auth:
{
"mcpServers": {
"proxmox": {
"command": "docker",
"args": ["run", "-i", "--rm",
"-e", "PROXMOX_HOST",
"-e", "PROXMOX_USER",
"-e", "PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME",
"-e", "PROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE",
"ghcr.io/akmalovaa/proxmox-mcp:latest"]
}
}
}
docker run -e VAR without a value passes the host variable through — no secrets in the config file. Restart the client — 32 read-only Proxmox tools become available (more if you raise PROXMOX_RISK_LEVEL).
For password auth, swap the token vars for PROXMOX_PASSWORD.
Note: Claude Desktop on macOS is launched via launchd and does not inherit
~/.zprofile/~/.zshrc. Either put the exports in~/.zshenv, or fall back to an inline"env": { ... }block in the config.
Configuration
All settings are environment variables — set them in your shell profile, pass them inline to docker run -e, or declare them in your MCP client's env block.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
PROXMOX_HOST | — | Proxmox host (IP or hostname) |
PROXMOX_USER | root@pam | API user |
| Auth | — | token or password — see below |
PROXMOX_PORT | 8006 | API port |
PROXMOX_VERIFY_SSL | false | Verify TLS certificate |
PROXMOX_TIMEOUT | 15 | Seconds to wait for each API request |
PROXMOX_RISK_LEVEL | read | read / lifecycle / all — see Risk levels |
PROXMOX_TOOLS_ALLOW | — | Comma-separated tool names to register, on top of the risk level |
PROXMOX_REDACT_SECRETS | true | Mask cipassword / sshkeys in responses |
Transport settings live under a PROXMOX_MCP_ prefix — see Streamable HTTP.
Authentication: token or password
Pick one. If both are set, the token wins.
Token (recommended):
export PROXMOX_USER=mcp@pve
export PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME=mcp
export PROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
Setting only one half of the pair is a startup error rather than a silent fallback to
the password — a typo in PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME used to mean quietly running as whoever
PROXMOX_USER is.
Password (fallback):
export PROXMOX_PASSWORD=your-password
Least privilege
An MCP server is reachable by a model acting on text it did not write, so give it its
own user and its own token rather than root@pam. On the Proxmox host:
# a user that is not root, with a role that matches the risk level you plan to run
pveum user add mcp@pve
pveum acl modify / --users mcp@pve --roles PVEAuditor # read
# pveum acl modify / --users mcp@pve --roles PVEVMAdmin # lifecycle / all
# a token for that user. Privilege Separation ON (the default) means the token starts
# with no rights at all, so grant it the same role explicitly:
pveum user token add mcp@pve mcp --privsep 1
pveum acl modify / --tokens 'mcp@pve!mcp' --roles PVEAuditor
Check what the token actually ended up with:
pveum user permissions mcp@pve --token mcp
PVEAuditor covers all 32 read tools. PVEVMAdmin on /vms adds guest lifecycle and
snapshots; migrate_vm additionally needs VM.Migrate on the target node, and
clone_vm needs Datastore.AllocateSpace on the target storage. Narrow the ACL path
(/vms/101, /pool/homelab) if the server should only see part of the cluster.
root@pam still works and is the quickest thing for a local look around — it is just
not what should be left running.
Risk levels
PROXMOX_RISK_LEVEL controls which tools exist. Tools above the active level are not registered, so they never appear in the MCP client's tool list:
| Level | Tools | Adds |
|---|---|---|
read (default) | 32 | read-only tools |
lifecycle | 46 | + start / stop / reboot / suspend / clone / migrate / create-snapshot |
all | 50 | + delete-snapshot / rollback-snapshot |
Each elevated call is also re-checked at call time and logged to stderr (ALLOW / DENY + tool + tier).
The active level is not otherwise observable from the client side — a tool that is
missing looks the same as a tool that was never written — so get_server_info reports
it, along with the versions and the tool count.
PROXMOX_TOOLS_ALLOW narrows further within the tier, for a deployment that serves
one specific agent:
export PROXMOX_TOOLS_ALLOW=list_nodes,list_containers,get_container_status,get_cluster_resources
Names that do not exist are a startup error, so a typo cannot silently amputate the
tool list. Keep get_server_info on the list unless you have a reason not to — it is
how a client learns what the rest of the list means.
Response shape
Inventory listings (list_nodes, list_vms, list_containers, get_cluster_resources)
return a compact subset of each row: identity, status, uptime, CPU and memory. What is
dropped is per-second IO counters and PSI pressure gauges — real data, but nothing a
triage decision turns on, and several times the volume of what is kept. Pass
verbose=true for the untouched rows.
Write tools answer with the task Proxmox accepted, not with a finished result:
{"state":"accepted","operation":"start_vm","node":"pve","vmid":101,
"upid":"UPID:pve:...","poll_with":"get_task_status"}
cipassword and sshkeys are replaced with ***redacted*** everywhere, keeping the key
so the model can still tell that cloud-init is configured. Set
PROXMOX_REDACT_SECRETS=false to get the raw values.
Streamable HTTP
stdio stays the default and is what an MCP client on your own machine should use. For a shared deployment — a container in a cluster, several clients on one URL — set the transport and nothing else changes:
docker run --rm -p 8000:8000 \
-e PROXMOX_HOST -e PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME -e PROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE \
-e PROXMOX_MCP_TRANSPORT=streamable-http \
-e PROXMOX_MCP_HOST=0.0.0.0 \
-e PROXMOX_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS=proxmox-mcp.example.com \
ghcr.io/akmalovaa/proxmox-mcp:latest
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
PROXMOX_MCP_TRANSPORT | stdio | stdio or streamable-http |
PROXMOX_MCP_HOST | 127.0.0.1 | Bind address — 0.0.0.0 in a container |
PROXMOX_MCP_PORT | 8000 | Port |
PROXMOX_MCP_PATH | /mcp | Endpoint path |
PROXMOX_MCP_JSON_RESPONSE | true | JSON responses instead of an SSE stream |
PROXMOX_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS | — | Host headers to accept; * disables the check |
PROXMOX_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS | — | Browser origins allowed; empty = same-origin only |
The prefix is PROXMOX_MCP_, not PROXMOX_, because Kubernetes injects <SERVICE>_PORT
for every linked Service — a Service named proxmox would otherwise redefine
PROXMOX_PORT.
Sessions are not used (stateless_http): they were removed from the protocol in
revision 2026-07-28, and without them several clients can share one URL and a rolling
update does not cut anyone off.
Host and Origin validation. Binding anything other than loopback requires
PROXMOX_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS; the server refuses to start otherwise. A foreign Origin
gets 403 and an unexpected Host gets 421 — this is what stops a page in a browser on
the same LAN from driving the server through DNS rebinding. A request with no Origin
header (curl, MCP clients) always passes. Set PROXMOX_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS=* only when
something in front already validates it.
There is no authentication. Anyone who can reach the endpoint gets whatever
PROXMOX_RISK_LEVEL allows. Put it behind a gateway, an authenticating proxy or a
network boundary you trust, and keep PROXMOX_RISK_LEVEL=read unless the path to it is
authenticated.
Health endpoints are served alongside /mcp and need no auth:
| Path | Meaning |
|---|---|
GET /healthz | The process is up. Never touches Proxmox — a liveness probe that fails when Proxmox is down would restart the server in a loop and fix nothing. |
GET /readyz | Proxmox answered version.get(). This is the one that should gate traffic; 503 with a readable reason otherwise. |
livenessProbe:
httpGet: { path: /healthz, port: 8000 }
readinessProbe:
httpGet: { path: /readyz, port: 8000 }
Flags mirror the variables for interactive use: uvx proxmox-ve-mcp --transport streamable-http --port 8080.
Sentry (optional)
Tool calls and failures can be shipped to Sentry — every tools/call
becomes a span, every failing tool an issue. Nothing is sent, and the SDK is never even
imported, while SENTRY_DSN is unset.
The ghcr.io image already contains the SDK. From PyPI, install the extra:
uvx --from 'proxmox-ve-mcp[sentry]' proxmox-ve-mcp
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
SENTRY_DSN | — | Set it to enable reporting |
SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT | production | Free-form environment label |
SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE | 1.0 | Share of tool calls traced |
SENTRY_SEND_DEFAULT_PII | false | Send tool arguments and results as span data |
Leave SENTRY_SEND_DEFAULT_PII off unless you mean it: with it on, tool arguments and
results are attached to spans, and get_vm_config returns ssh keys and cipassword
hashes. A DSN set without the extra installed logs a warning and the server runs on.
Tools
Nodes (10)
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
list_nodes | List all cluster nodes with status, CPU, memory, uptime |
get_node_status | Detailed node metrics (CPU, memory, disk, load, kernel) |
get_node_networks | Network interfaces on a node |
get_node_disks | Physical disks on a node |
get_node_services | Proxmox system services and their state |
get_node_updates | Pending APT package updates |
get_node_rrd_data | Historical CPU/memory/disk/network metrics (RRD) |
get_node_tasks | Recent tasks on a node, optionally errors only |
get_task_status | Status of a specific task by UPID |
get_task_log | Log output from a task |
QEMU VMs (17)
| Tool | Tier | Description |
|---|---|---|
list_vms | read | List all VMs, optionally filter by node |
get_vm_status | read | Current VM status (running/stopped, CPU, memory) |
get_vm_config | read | VM configuration (hardware, disks, network) |
get_vm_network_interfaces | read | IP addresses of a running VM (via QEMU guest agent) |
get_vm_rrd_data | read | Historical CPU/memory/disk/network metrics (RRD) |
list_vm_snapshots | read | List all snapshots of a VM |
start_vm | lifecycle | Start a VM |
stop_vm | lifecycle | Force-stop a VM — annotated destructive, unsaved guest state is lost |
shutdown_vm | lifecycle | Graceful ACPI shutdown with timeout |
reboot_vm | lifecycle | Reboot via ACPI |
suspend_vm | lifecycle | Suspend a VM |
resume_vm | lifecycle | Resume a suspended VM |
clone_vm | lifecycle | Full or linked clone |
migrate_vm | lifecycle | Move a VM to another node, online or offline |
create_vm_snapshot | lifecycle | Create a snapshot |
delete_vm_snapshot | all | Delete a snapshot |
rollback_vm_snapshot | all | Rollback to a snapshot |
LXC Containers (13)
| Tool | Tier | Description |
|---|---|---|
list_containers | read | List all LXC containers, optionally filter by node |
get_container_status | read | Current container status |
get_container_config | read | Container configuration |
get_container_interfaces | read | IP addresses of a running container |
get_container_rrd_data | read | Historical CPU/memory/disk/network metrics (RRD) |
list_container_snapshots | read | List all snapshots |
start_container | lifecycle | Start a container |
stop_container | lifecycle | Force-stop a container — annotated destructive |
shutdown_container | lifecycle | Graceful shutdown with timeout |
reboot_container | lifecycle | Reboot a container |
create_container_snapshot | lifecycle | Create a snapshot |
delete_container_snapshot | all | Delete a snapshot |
rollback_container_snapshot | all | Rollback to a snapshot |
Storage (2)
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
list_storage | Storage pools with usage, optionally filter by node |
get_storage_content | Contents of a storage pool (ISOs, backups, images, templates) |
Cluster (7)
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
get_cluster_status | Cluster health, quorum, node membership |
get_cluster_resources | All resources (VMs, containers, storage, nodes) |
get_cluster_backups | Configured backup jobs |
get_ha_status | High-availability resources and their state |
list_pools | Resource pools |
get_cluster_log | Cluster-wide event log, newest first |
get_next_vmid | Next available VM/container ID |
Server (1)
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
get_server_info | This server's own risk level, tool count, versions and Proxmox reachability |
Architecture
src/proxmox_mcp/
├── server.py # MCPServer instance, health routes, transport selection, entry point
├── config.py # Pydantic Settings (PROXMOX_) + transport config (PROXMOX_MCP_)
├── client.py # Proxmoxer connection, built once per process
└── tools/ # nodes, vms, containers, storage, cluster, server_info
- Read-only by default — elevated tools gated by
PROXMOX_RISK_LEVEL - Gated at registration — a tool above the tier is absent from
tools/list, not refused at call time: what the model cannot see, it cannot retry - Admission and annotations are separate —
tier=is the operator's policy,annotations=is what the client is told a call does, so a force-stop can bedestructiveHint: trueand still live at thelifecycletier - Lazy connection — the Proxmoxer client is built on first use, once, and shared; the server therefore starts cleanly even when Proxmox is unreachable
- Raw JSON output — compact, no formatting; LLM consumes data directly
- Normalized errors — Proxmox and network failures are translated into one
actionable sentence instead of a
requeststraceback
Development
Run standalone (testing)
export PROXMOX_HOST=192.168.1.100
export PROXMOX_USER=root@pam
export PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME=mcp
export PROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
docker run -i --rm \
-e PROXMOX_HOST -e PROXMOX_USER \
-e PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME -e PROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE \
ghcr.io/akmalovaa/proxmox-mcp:latest
Without Docker (UV)
git clone https://github.com/akmalovaa/proxmox-mcp.git && cd proxmox-mcp && uv sync
MCP client config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"proxmox": {
"command": "uv",
"args": ["run", "--directory", "/path/to/proxmox-mcp", "python", "-m", "proxmox_mcp"],
"env": {
"PROXMOX_HOST": "192.168.1.100",
"PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME": "mcp",
"PROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE": "xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx"
}
}
}
}
Build from source
git clone https://github.com/akmalovaa/proxmox-mcp.git
cd proxmox-mcp
docker build -t proxmox-mcp .
The image is multi-stage: uv builds the virtualenv in a throwaway layer, and the
runtime stage carries only Python plus the venv and runs as the unprivileged mcp
user (uid 10001).
Lint, type-check, test
uv sync --locked --group dev
uv run ruff check .
uv run mypy src/
uv run pytest -v
License
MIT
