Apier MCP Server — Norwegian company data and compliance for AI agents

Apier is a hosted MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that gives AI agents structured access to Norwegian company data and regulatory compliance. It resolves any 9-digit organisasjonsnummer (organisation number) against Brønnøysundregistrene (the Brønnøysund Register Centre / Enhetsregisteret), answers who holds signing authority for a company (signaturrett and prokura), reads annual accounts (årsregnskap) from Regnskapsregisteret, computes filing deadlines for MVA, A-melding and Årsregnskap, and brokers fullmakt — scoped, revocable company→agent authority delegated through an Altinn 3 systembruker, authenticated upstream via Maskinporten against Skatteetaten and other agencies. This repository is the thin, hardened npm proxy (@apier-no/mcp) that connects local stdio MCP clients to the hosted server.

What you can ask

With this server connected, an AI agent can answer questions like:

• "What's the organisasjonsnummer for Equinor?" (search_companies)
• "Who can legally sign on behalf of org number 923 609 016 — and is it signaturrett or prokura?" (get_company_authority)
• "Is this company VAT-registered, and what regulatory obligations does it have?" (get_company_summary)
• "What filing deadlines is this company facing in the next six months?" (get_company_deadlines)
• "Show me the latest annual accounts (årsregnskap) for this company." (get_company_accounts)
• "What is the Altinn 3 equivalent of this old Altinn 2 role code?" (get_altinn_migration_guidance)
• "What's the current Norges Bank exchange rate for EUR to NOK?" (get_exchange_rate)
• "Request a fullmakt so I can act on behalf of this company, then verify it before filing." (request_fullmakt, check_fullmakt)

Tools

All 25 tools exposed by the hosted server at https://www.apier.no/api/mcp (discovered live via tools/list on 2026-10-10; each row is the opening sentence of the live description, so the full text is one tools/list call away):

Try without a key

Starting this proxy requires APIER_API_KEY (see Quickstart). The proxy forwards whatever bearer you give it as Authorization: Bearer … and never inspects the key's shape. Without a real key you still have two sandbox paths, both served from synthetic fixtures and never from a government register:

• Direct HTTP to the sandbox mirror under /api/v1/sandbox/ on apier.no. Every Category B company endpoint has a mirror there. It is not zero-auth: it expects a self-invented sandbox bearer, apier_sandbox_test_<suffix> (any suffix of 1–64 characters from A-Za-z0-9_-), which the server recognises by its prefix and answers with fixtures — no signup and no key store behind it. A separate, truly zero-auth mirror lives under /api/v1/sandbox/public/ for the single fixture org 999999999.
• The same sandbox bearer on the hosted MCP endpoint https://www.apier.no/api/mcp. Send Authorization: Bearer apier_sandbox_test_<suffix> and the fixture-backed company tools (get_company_context, get_company_obligations, get_company_deadlines, get_company_summary, get_company_verification, explain_compliance_error, get_company_authority, get_company_accounts, get_company_filing_history) are routed to the sandbox mirror, with _meta.is_sandbox: true on every result; the remaining tools answer exactly as they would without a key. Because this proxy forwards the bearer unchanged, setting APIER_API_KEY to such a value lets a stdio client rehearse those tools against fixtures too.

List the canonical sandbox test data (no auth at all):

curl -sL https://apier.no/api/v1/sandbox/fixtures

Trimmed response — … marks omitted fields:

{"success":true,"data":{"schema_version":"1.0.0",
  "reserved_test_orgs":[{"org_number":"999000001","name":"Sandbox AS","entity_type":"AS","data_tier":"tier_1", …}],
  "realistic_orgs":[{"org_number":"818000006","name":"Fjellberg Regnskap AS","entity_type":"AS","data_tier":"tier_1_2"}, …],
  "magic_scenarios":[{"org_number":"999660010","state":"konkurs","label":"Bankrupt (konkurs)"}, …], …}}

Verify the bankrupt fixture company with a self-invented bearer — any suffix of 1–64 chars from A-Za-z0-9_- after apier_sandbox_test_ works; here bash's $RANDOM supplies one. (This call goes to the www host directly: the apex→www 308 redirect makes curl drop the Authorization header.)

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer apier_sandbox_test_$RANDOM" https://www.apier.no/api/v1/sandbox/company/999660010/verify

Trimmed response — … marks omitted fields:

{"success":true,"data":{"org_number":"999660010","name":"Sandbox Konkurs AS",
  "verification_status":"fail",
  "signals":{"is_active":false,"not_bankrupt":false, …},
  "summary":"Selskapet er ikke aktivt registrert i Enhetsregisteret.", …}}

Don't confuse the two prefixes: a real API key is apr_<tier>_… (apr_free_, apr_starter_, apr_pro_ or apr_ent_) and comes from signup via https://www.apier.no/docs/authentication, while apier_sandbox_test_ is self-generated and needs no signup. (Earlier README versions mentioned apier_live_ / apier_test_ keys; no key of that shape was ever issued.) GET /api/v1/sandbox/fixtures is the canonical machine-readable table of sandbox test data.

Quickstart

Hosted endpoint (streamable HTTP)

The fastest path — no install. Point any streamable-HTTP-capable MCP client at:

https://www.apier.no/api/mcp

Discovery is keyless: initialize, tools/list, resources and prompts all work without credentials, so an agent can explore the full catalogue before authenticating. An API key (Authorization: Bearer apr_<tier>_…) is needed only for protected tool calls. See https://www.apier.no/docs/authentication for how to get a key, then create one in the dashboard at https://www.apier.no/dashboard.

npx stdio proxy (@apier-no/mcp)

For stdio-only clients, this package wraps mcp-remote, reads APIER_API_KEY from your environment, removes it from the spawned child's environment, redacts it from stderr, and hands the bearer value over out-of-band so it never appears on the child's command line — see SECURITY.md.

mcp-remote moved from geelen/mcp-remote to punkpeye/mcp-remote; the npm package name is unchanged, and 0.8.1 is published with SLSA provenance attestations.

Published as @apier-no/mcp. The @apier scope was unavailable, so this package ships under the @apier-no scope.

Claude Desktop / Cursor (claude_desktop_config.json / ~/.cursor/mcp.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "apier": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@apier-no/mcp"],
      "env": { "APIER_API_KEY": "apr_<tier>_<your_key_here>" }
    }
  }
}

VS Code (.vscode/mcp.json):

{
  "servers": {
    "apier": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@apier-no/mcp"],
      "env": { "APIER_API_KEY": "apr_<tier>_<your_key_here>" }
    }
  }
}

Zed (settings.json):

{
  "context_servers": {
    "apier": {
      "source": "custom",
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@apier-no/mcp"],
      "env": { "APIER_API_KEY": "apr_<tier>_<your_key_here>" }
    }
  }
}

Ready-to-paste config files for each client live in examples/.

Configuration

Security

• APIER_API_KEY is read by the parent process and scrubbed from the spawned child's environment, and stderr is passed through a redactor that strips Bearer …, bare apr_<tier>_… keys and apr_issue_… key-issuance tokens, the legacy apier_(live|test)_… shape, ghp_…, and Authorization: substrings.
• The key never appears in the child's command line. The --header argument carries only the placeholder Authorization:${APIER_MCP_AUTH_HEADER}; the bearer value is passed out-of-band in that variable and expanded by mcp-remote at request time. Command lines are world-readable on Linux (/proc/<pid>/cmdline), process environments are not — so this is no longer readable by other local users (#33, fixed in 1.2.0). An attacker already running as you can still read the environment — see SECURITY.md.
• Non-https endpoints are rejected before spawn; mcp-remote is exact-pinned and releases are published with npm provenance via GitHub Actions Trusted Publishing (OIDC).
• Treat client config files (claude_desktop_config.json, .cursor/mcp.json, …) like .env files — never commit them with a real key.

Full threat model and disclosure policy: SECURITY.md.

Documentation

• MCP server docs: https://www.apier.no/docs/mcp
• Apier platform docs: https://apier.no/docs

License

MIT