Firmware Attestation MCP

Hardware trust layer for sovereign AI. Persistence implants live below the OS (BIOS/UEFI, SMM, network boot ROMs, HDD HPA) and survive OS reinstalls and disk wipes. This MCP attests a host's firmware trust state and gates inference on a verified result.

Tools

Tool	What
`scan_firmware`	read-only host evidence (Secure Boot, TPM, SIP, BIOS, HPA)
`check_ant_signatures`	match to NSA-ANT-class persistence preconditions + defenses
`attest_firmware`	HMAC-signed attestation, verifiable at `proofof.ai/api/verify`
`gate_inference`	ALLOW/BLOCK AI on this host (strict by default)
`list_threat_model`	the attack surface this defends against

Honest by design

Reports indicators (preconditions implants rely on), never "clean". A BLOCK means "lacks confirmed trust anchors," not "hacked." Harden per the listed defenses, then re-gate.

pip install firmware-attestation-mcp

Configuration

Add to your claude_desktop_config.json (Claude Desktop) or your MCP client config:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "firmware-attestation-mcp": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["firmware-attestation-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Or: pip install firmware-attestation-mcp then run the firmware-attestation-mcp command (stdio transport).

Examples

Once configured, ask your assistant, for example:

"Use scan_firmware to …"
"Use check_ant_signatures to …"
"Use attest_firmware to …"

Part of the MEOK constellation

This MCP is one node in a connected ecosystem built by MEOK AI LABS around a single sovereign AI core — governed agents with a hash-chained audit trail, mapped to the CSOAI compliance charter.

🌐 The whole map: https://meok.ai/constellation
🛡️ AI governance & certification: https://councilof.ai · https://csoai.org
✅ Verify any signed report: https://meok.ai/verify

firmware attestation mcp