Meter, cap, and block AI agent spend before the provider is charged.
One address for any MCP client. No sign-in needed on this server.
3 read3 act8 other
Grouped by tool name. At most: moves money, runs code or commands, deletes data, or sends messages for you.
Odel charges nothing per call. The publisher may charge for its own service.
Track AI agent spend across x402/MPP/API-key rails, set budget caps, catch spending anomalies, keep audit trails. The "Datadog for agent spending" — the #1 verified community ask from agent builders.
🎯 Free tier: 3 agents per workspace, no card, no login.
POST /startmints the workspace and shows the key once.
Connecting takes no auth handshake. Before your first write you need a workspace_key, which you get one of two ways:
POST /v1/billing/x402 with an
X-PAYMENT header. The paying wallet becomes the workspace identity —
no email, no login, no human in the loop./start — no
signup, no login, no card. The workspace_key is shown once, right there, and
the page carries the upgrade link for that workspace.The key claims new agent_ids. Each claim mints that agent's own
agent_secret, which is what authenticates every later write — the
workspace_key is never needed again for that agent.
Claude Code:
claude mcp add --transport http agent-ledger https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/
Codex:
codex mcp add agent-ledger --url https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/
Cursor — merge into mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"agent-ledger": {
"url": "https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/"
}
}
}
Any other MCP client: point it at the streamable-http remote
https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/ — no headers,
no auth handshake required to connect.
Try these prompts once connected:
# Track a spend — the FIRST call for a new agent_id CLAIMS it, so it needs
# your workspace_key, and it returns that agent's agent_secret.
# Save the secret: every later write (track/budget) to this agent_id uses it
# instead, and needs no workspace_key.
curl -X POST https://aiagentscity.com/v1/track \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "AL-API-Version: 2026-09-01" \
-d '{"agent_id":"YOUR_AGENT_ID","rail":"x402","amount_cents":100,"service":"search_query","workspace_key":"YOUR_WORKSPACE_KEY"}'
# Set a monthly budget cap — pass the agent_secret from above
curl -X POST https://aiagentscity.com/v1/budget \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "AL-API-Version: 2026-09-01" \
-d '{"agent_id":"YOUR_AGENT_ID","monthly_cents":5000,"agent_secret":"YOUR_SAVED_SECRET"}'
# Spend report + anomalies — requires the agent_secret from above
curl https://aiagentscity.com/v1/report/YOUR_AGENT_ID \
-H "X-Agent-Secret: YOUR_SAVED_SECRET"
Want to just look at it? Every agent has a human-readable page (send the
secret as a header, no curl needed for the JSON):
https://aiagentscity.com/v1/report/YOUR_AGENT_ID/html
/v1/report, /v1/tokens, and /v1/alerts all require either
X-Agent-Secret: <agent's secret> or X-Workspace-Key: <the workspace's key>
— missing or wrong credential gets 401. Headers only: there is no cookie or
session arm, and no unauthenticated read path on REST or MCP. This is what
stops a stranger from reading or overwriting someone else's agent_id.
Note this is a deliberate break from AgentLedger's earlier "share the link, anyone can read it" behavior — traded for real isolation between customers.
pip install "aiagentscity-ledger[wrapper]" # client only: the wrapper + the CLI
agent-ledger init --agent YOUR_AGENT_ID # mints a workspace, claims the agent, writes .env
from openai import OpenAI
import agentledger
client = agentledger.wrap(OpenAI(api_key=OPENAI_KEY),
agent_id="YOUR_AGENT_ID", agent_secret="<from .env>")
That is the whole integration. wrap() repoints the client's base URL at the proxy and
adds two identity headers — it does not patch or subclass the SDK, so streaming, tool
calls and retries behave exactly as before. Anthropic's client works identically. Your
provider key is forwarded untouched and never stored.
Not using a Python SDK? Point any OpenAI- or Anthropic-compatible client at
<base>/proxy/openai/v1/ (or /proxy/anthropic) with X-AL-Agent and X-AL-Secret.
{
"mcpServers": {
"agent-ledger": {
"url": "https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/"
}
}
}
Tools: ledger_track, ledger_set_budget, ledger_check_spend, ledger_report, ledger_alerts,
ledger_price, ledger_proxy_attach, ledger_api_docs, ledger_examples,
ledger_request_approval, ledger_approvals, ledger_approval_decide,
ledger_start, ledger_rotate_secret, ledger_revoke_secret.
Agent-facing API reference: llms.txt
Runnable code recipes: recipes.md
providers.json lists the vendors the proxy can forward
to (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek and Moonshot ship as examples); adding one is a config editbase_url at /proxy/{provider}
and a call that would cross the cap is refused before the provider is contacted, so the money
is never spent. Pass-through: your provider key is forwarded, never storedPOST /v1/report/{agent_id}/share mints a read-only,
expiring URL that opens in a plain browser (no header, no credential); revoke the
lot in one callagent_secret never bricks an agent_id: the
workspace_key mints a replacement (POST /v1/agents/{agent_id}/rotate-secret) or
revokes it while keeping the spend historyledger_engine.py): per-agent JSONL ledgers, budget state, alert log,
per-agent secret (ensure_agent_secret — a new claim requires a workspace_key,
and mints the agent's own agent_secret for every write after it)identity.py): the single place a caller is resolved — agent_secret
or workspace_key, both header-borne. Every gate (claim, read, billing) calls
into it rather than rolling its own check.workspace_engine.py): per-customer identity + plan state, keyed by
wallet address (x402, no human) or by nothing at all for a plain POST /start
workspaceapi_server.py, FastAPI): app creation, meta endpoints, the human
start/buy pages and router includes; endpoints live in routes_agents.py and
routes_billing.py. Hosted streamable-http MCP at /mcp/
/v1/agents (full cross-tenant listing) is owner-only, requires X-Al-Admin header/v1/report, /v1/tokens, /v1/alerts) require X-Agent-Secret or
X-Workspace-Key; the MCP read tools take the same two credentials as
parameters, so neither surface has an unauthenticated read pathPOST /v1/agents/{agent_id}/rotate-secret and
/revoke-secret are workspace_key-only. An agent's own agent_secret
deliberately cannot rotate itself — if it could, a leaked agent credential
would permanently lock its real owner out. Revoke overwrites the stored
secret rather than deleting it, so the agent_id stays claimed and cannot be
picked up by another workspace[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,64} (path-traversal safe),
rail whitelisted to mpp/x402/api_key/manual, amount + budget caps bounded [0, $100k]STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET_AL; a verified pro checkout marks
that workspace its paid tier via its client_reference_id (Starter $19/mo ⇒ 10
agents on that workspace only; Team $79/mo ⇒ 50; the x402 Pro pass is the only
unbounded grant).