A local-first security scanner for developers. One binary, no account.

Install · Quickstart · Usage · Commands · How it works

husk scans your machine for compromised packages, leaked secrets, risky install scripts, and unsafe AI/MCP configuration, then shows you what to fix. It runs locally: no login, no account, no file ever leaves your machine. An online scan sends only package names, versions, and CVE ids to public advisory databases (OSV.dev, npm, PyPI, GitHub, CISA KEV / FIRST EPSS); --offline makes zero network calls.

Pre-1.0 software without an independent audit. Interfaces can change between releases. Bug reports and questions are welcome in Issues.

Install

husk runs on Linux and macOS. On Windows, run it inside WSL, where it installs and behaves exactly as it does on Linux. There is no native Windows build.

Download the latest signed release, verify its checksum, and install it:

curl -fsSL https://husk-security.dev/install.sh | sh

It installs to ~/.local/bin, overridable with HUSK_INSTALL_DIR or --install-dir. If that directory is not already on your PATH, it asks before adding it to your shell's startup file and names the exact file it would change. Decline, or run it without a terminal, and it prints the one command that adds it instead. --no-modify-path never writes to a startup file at all.

_{Prefer not to pipe into a shell? Download install.sh, read it, then run
it. Every release is cosign-signed and SLSA-attested; the installer verifies the
SHA-256 checksum (and the signature too, when cosign is on your PATH). See
verifying a release.}

Other install sources

Source Command
cargo cargo install husk-sec
cargo-binstall cargo binstall husk-sec
npm npm install -g husk-sec

Nix

Run it without installing anything:
nix run github:husk-security/husk -- scan
The flake exposes two packages: husk (the default, with the localhost web UI) and husk-tui (the same binary without it, so it needs no Node toolchain).

For persistent use, add the flake as an input and put the package in your configuration. NixOS:
{
  inputs.husk.url = "github:husk-security/husk";
  inputs.husk.inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";

  outputs = { nixpkgs, husk, ... }: {
    nixosConfigurations.myhost = nixpkgs.lib.nixosSystem {
      system = "x86_64-linux";
      modules = [
        { environment.systemPackages = [ husk.packages.x86_64-linux.husk ]; }
      ];
    };
  };
}
Home Manager, with the same input:
home.packages = [ husk.packages.x86_64-linux.husk ];
If you would rather put it on PATH imperatively than declare it, nix profile install github:husk-security/husk also works.

Quickstart

husk            # print help (no subcommand does nothing else)
husk scan       # one-shot scan of the current directory, plain terminal summary
husk web        # serve the local web UI and open it in your browser
husk tui        # browse the latest scan in the terminal UI

husk with no subcommand prints help and exits, like git or cargo. The entry points are husk scan (scan and print the report), husk web (the local web UI, opened in your browser), and husk tui (the terminal UI).

Usage

A few of the commands you'll actually run day to day. The full list (every subcommand and flag) is in the command reference.

Scan a directory and print the findings report:

$ husk scan --offline .
packages: 286  findings: 36  critical: 5  high: 16  medium: 15  low: 0  info: 0

  critical risky-agent-config  AI agent is allowed unrestricted shell access
           .claude/settings.local.json:4
  high     lifecycle-script    Dangerous npm postinstall script
           package.json:6
  high     risky-agent-config  MCP config contains hardcoded secret
           .mcp.json:7
  ...

Vet one package before you install it (a live OSV.dev lookup):

$ husk check lodash@4.17.20
!! vulnerable npm lodash@4.17.20
   advisory GHSA-35jh-r3h4-6jhm via OSV.dev
   Command Injection in lodash
   Install a fixed version instead, or avoid the dependency until one is available.

The version can be an @version suffix (split on the last @, so @scope/pkg@1.2.3 works) or separate arguments: husk check npm lodash 4.17.20. A bare name (husk check lodash) assumes npm and checks malware advisories only.

Protect normal and lockfile installs with the tracked Safe Chain task in the Guide. Husk recommends the free, MIT-licensed third-party tool instead of shipping a weaker package-manager wrapper:

Review Aikido Safe Chain

Commit a project policy (block/allow packages, suppress triaged findings, set the CI threshold); the .husk/ directory is meant to be committed:

$ husk init
Created ./.husk/policy.toml
  `husk scan` and `husk ci` in this project now read this policy.

$ husk approve npm:lodash          # allow a package; recorded in policy + ledger

Plan safe fixes (dry-run by default; --apply writes them, with backups):

husk fix                          # show the plan, change nothing
husk fix --apply                  # write the auto-safe fixes

Gate a build in CI, JSON on stdout, non-zero exit at or above the threshold:

husk ci                           # exit 1 on high+ findings (see JSON output below)

Environment

husk reads a few environment variables:

Variable	Effect
`HUSK_HOME`	State directory (ledger, daemon state, credentials); default `~/.husk`.
`HUSK_CACHE_DIR`	Cache directory (reports, scan index); default `~/.cache/husk`.
`HUSK_PAGER`, `PAGER`	Pager for long reports (default `less`); an empty value or `cat` disables paging.
`NO_COLOR`	Disable ANSI colors in CLI output.
`HUSK_TOKEN`	Bearer-token override for cloud commands (CI or one-off use).

Command reference

One binary, many subcommands. Run husk <command> --help for the full flags of any of them.

husk scan: Scan now and print the findings report
husk status: Print the last scan's report without rescanning
husk tui: Open the interactive terminal UI on the latest scan
husk web: Serve the local web UI on the latest scan
husk check: Look up one package's malware/vulnerability verdict
husk ci: Scan and gate a build; exit 1 at/above the threshold
husk fix: Plan fixes from the latest scan; write them with --apply
husk init: Create a committed .husk/policy.toml project policy
husk approve: Record an allow/block/suppress decision in the policy
husk policy: Show the active project policy and its counts
husk ledger: Show or verify the personal trust ledger
husk daemon: Scan on an interval; report findings new since last run
husk login: Sign in to a husk account (coming soon)
husk logout: Delete the credentials stored on this machine
husk account: Show the signed-in account and machine link
husk sync: Upload the last scan's inventory for retroactive alerts
husk alerts: List this account's retroactive alerts
husk telemetry: Manage opt-in anonymous telemetry (off by default)
husk feedback: Send feedback to the husk developers
husk mcp: Run the MCP server, or register it with an AI agent

JSON output

Several commands emit the full scan report as JSON: husk scan --json, husk status --json, husk tui --json, and husk ci (always JSON). The shape is identical everywhere; it is the report the local cache stores and every UI renders. It is plain JSON on stdout: never paged, never colored, safe to pipe straight into jq.

Field	Type	Meaning
`api_version`	number	Report-shape version (currently `4`). Bumped when the shape changes; check it before parsing deeply.
`generated_at`	string (RFC 3339)	When the scan finished. Reports older than 24 hours are considered stale by the UIs.
`roots`	string[]	The directories that were scanned.
`context`	object	System context: user, OS/arch, distro, kernel, git identity, detected package managers and dev configs.
`packages`	object[]	The package inventory: `{ecosystem, name, version, manifest_path, line}` per discovered coordinate.
`projects`	object[]	Discovered projects (the unit of attention); findings join to these via `Finding.project_id`.
`summary`	object	The security headline (counts and framing used by the UIs).
`findings`	object[]	Open findings. Each has `id`, `title`, `severity` (`critical`/`high`/`medium`/`low`/`info`), `category`, `source`, `path`, `line`, `summary`, `evidence` (pre-redacted), `recommendation`, `references`, `cves`, plus optional `package`, `project_id`, `rule_id`, `confidence`, `priority`, `exploit` (CISA KEV / EPSS), and `fixed_version`.
`ignored`	object[]	Findings silenced by project policy or ledger decisions, kept out of `findings`, stats, and scoring.
`controls`	object[]	Results from registered guide controls: status, local evidence, and related finding ids.
`remediations`	object[]	Typed remediation proposals owned by controls; includes execution class, severity, operation, and related finding ids.
`guidance`	object	The assessed Markdown guide: baseline/recommendation items, scan priority, review decisions, and handled percentage.
`providers`	object[]	Per intel source: `{name, ok, checked_packages, findings, message}`. `ok: false` means coverage was incomplete.
`benchmarks`	object[]	Per-stage timing: `{stage, elapsed_ms, files_checked, bytes_scanned, packages_checked, findings, workers, detail}`.
`stats`	object	Totals: `{packages, findings, critical, high, medium, low, info}`.
`delta`	object?	What changed since the previous cached scan of the same roots: `{previous_at, previous_score, score, new_count, unchanged_count, resolved_count, resolved}`. Absent on a first scan.

husk scan --json | jq -r '.findings[].id'                 # every finding id, worst first
test "$(husk status --json | jq .stats.critical)" -eq 0   # fail a script on any critical
husk ci | jq '.providers[] | select(.ok | not)'           # which intel sources had problems

How it works

Local-first. Scans read files and parse them statically; husk never executes what it scans. Results and state stay on your machine; an online scan sends only package coordinates and CVE ids to public advisory databases.
Package coverage. Discovery is a pluggable registry spanning ~68 package ecosystems (language managers, OS/distro databases, AI/agent/editor surfaces, CI/IaC/containers, and CycloneDX/SPDX SBOMs), see src/scan/targets/.
Exploit-aware. CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS enrichment sorts actively-exploited CVEs to the top instead of dumping an undifferentiated CVE list.
State that compounds. A committed .husk/policy.toml (block/allow, suppress, CI threshold) travels with your repo; a personal hash-chained trust ledger at ~/.husk/ledger.jsonl records every approve. Both are local, inspectable, and deletable.
Built for agents. husk mcp serves a Model Context Protocol server over stdio so AI agents can read findings and trigger scoped scans; husk mcp install <agent> writes the config. It is listed in the Model Context Protocol Registry as mcp-name: io.github.husk-security/husk. Agent-facing details live in AGENTS.md and integrations/.

Building from source

Cargo and Rust 1.95 or newer is all you need.

git clone https://github.com/husk-security/husk
cd husk
cargo build --release --no-default-features
./target/release/husk scan /path/to/your/project

The localhost web UI is a Vite + React app in web/ that the binary embeds (via rust-embed) under the default web Cargo feature. There are two build paths; pick one:

Full build (default feature). Build the frontend first, then compile. This is the only path that needs Node:

npm --prefix web ci
npm --prefix web run build      # → web/dist
cargo build --release           # rust-embed embeds web/dist

CLI/TUI-only (no Node needed). Drops the web UI entirely; nothing to build first:
```
cargo build --release --no-default-features
```

web/dist is generated output and is gitignored. A plain cargo build without building the frontend first fails with a clear error pointing you at one of the two paths above, because the web feature requires web/dist to exist.

If you already use Nix, the flake pins the same toolchain: nix develop gives you a shell with it, and nix build .#husk (web UI included) or nix build .#husk-tui (Node-free) builds the binary directly. None of it is required.

Developer documentation (the module layout, the three pluggable registries, and how to add a scanner) is in AGENTS.md.

Privacy & trust: what husk reads, what never leaves your machine, how releases are signed

husk is a security tool, so it holds itself to a higher standard than the things it scans. Every claim below is enforced by code or CI in this repository.

What husk reads. Manifests and lockfiles, package-manager databases, dotfiles and configs, git hook files, CI workflow files, MCP/agent configs, and text files (for secret patterns). Scans are strictly read-only. husk writes only its own state, ~/.husk/ (ledger, daemon state, cloud config) and the cache dir, plain files you can inspect and delete anytime.

What husk never does.

Never executes what it scans. No package managers, install scripts, git hooks, editor extensions, MCP servers, or repo code; detection is static parsing only. The one opt-in, per-invocation exception is husk fix --apply --deps, which runs your package manager's version-pin command, shown to you first.
Never uploads your files. During an online scan husk sends package names, versions, and CVE ids only to public advisory databases (OSV.dev, npm, PyPI, GitHub, CISA KEV / FIRST EPSS), never file contents, paths, or secrets. husk scan --offline makes zero network calls.
Never phones home by default. No account, no login wall; telemetry is off until you run husk telemetry on, and it honors DO_NOT_TRACK and a HUSK_TELEMETRY_DISABLED kill switch. All cloud features are opt-in and inert until used.
Never puts secrets in output. Secret findings carry short, pre-redacted excerpts, not the matched credential.

Verifiable properties.

Claim	Verify
100% safe Rust (`#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`)	`grep -rn "forbid(unsafe_code)" src/lib.rs src/main.rs`
No proprietary trust path: every verdict comes from a public source queried over TLS; no husk-curated feed or signing root in the scan / `husk check` path	`src/providers.rs`, `src/check.rs`
Signed releases (cosign keyless + SLSA provenance, built in CI from the tag)	verifying a release
Supply-chain-checked deps (cargo-deny / cargo-machete / Dependabot / Scorecard)	`ci.yml`, `scorecard.yml`
Every third-party GitHub Action pinned to a full commit SHA (husk flags actions that aren't)	`grep -rn "uses:" .github/workflows/`
Deterministic fixes: no LLM in the remediation apply path	`src/remediation/`

About tst/. tst/ holds intentionally unsafe fixtures (fake AWS keys like AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE, prompt-injection markdown, vulnerable pins) so husk's detectors can be tested deterministically. They are fake by policy and excluded from the crates.io package. If your scanner flags them inside this repo, it's working as intended; so is husk. tst/README.md explains what is in there and why, and tst/ is out of scope in SECURITY.md.

Vulnerabilities in husk itself go through the private channel in SECURITY.md, not public issues.

Verifying a release

Release verification details

Every release archive ships a SHA-256 checksum, a cosign keyless signature (Sigstore Fulcio + the Rekor transparency log, no long-lived key to steal), and a SLSA build-provenance attestation, all produced in CI from the tagged commit. install.sh verifies the checksum automatically (and the signature if cosign is present). To verify by hand:

VERSION="v0.0.1"
TARGET="x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu"          # or aarch64-apple-darwin, etc.
ARCHIVE="husk-${VERSION}-${TARGET}.tar.gz"

# 1. Checksum
sha256sum -c "${ARCHIVE}.sha256"           # macOS: shasum -a 256 -c ...

# 2. cosign signature: pin the workflow identity and the OIDC issuer
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle "${ARCHIVE}.sigstore.json" \
  --certificate-identity-regexp "^https://github.com/husk-security/husk/\.github/workflows/release\.yml@refs/tags/v" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  "${ARCHIVE}"

# 3. SLSA provenance
gh attestation verify "${ARCHIVE}" --repo husk-security/husk

A successful run prints Verified OK. If the identity or issuer doesn't match, the signature is rejected; that's the point. The exact release process is documented in .github/workflows/release.yml. Publishing requires a stable vX.Y.Z tag on a commit reachable from main, a matching version in Cargo.toml and flake.nix, and an explicitly allowed human for both the original workflow run and any re-run. The workflow does not rely on tag protection rules: it rechecks the live remote tag and its main ancestry immediately before publishing. An unauthorized tag can start a run, but it cannot reach the signing job.

Support and license

Building and developing: see building from source above and AGENTS.md. New detections ship with fixtures and tests.
Contributing: see CONTRIBUTING.md for the build and pull-request flow.
Getting help: usage questions, help interpreting findings, concrete bugs, and feature requests all go to Issues.
Security: report a vulnerability in husk itself privately, per SECURITY.md. Never open a public issue for one.
License: MIT.

Source	Command
cargo	`cargo install husk-sec`
cargo-binstall	`cargo binstall husk-sec`
npm	`npm install -g husk-sec`