[{"_1":2,"_3":-5,"_4":-5},"loaderData",{"_5":6,"_7":8,"_9":10},"actionData","errors","root",{"_131":132},"routes/modules.$creator.$moduleId",{"_14":15,"_16":17,"_18":19,"_20":21},"routes/modules.$creator.$moduleId.endpoints",{"_11":12,"_13":-5},"error","Module not found","tools","module",{"_20":22,"_23":24,"_25":26,"_27":28,"_29":30,"_31":32,"_33":34,"_35":26,"_36":37,"_38":-5,"_39":-5,"_40":-5,"_41":42,"_43":44,"_45":46,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":-5,"_56":48,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_61":-5,"_62":-5,"_63":-5,"_64":-5,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":72,"_73":74,"_75":-5,"_76":-5,"_77":-5,"_78":48,"_79":-5,"_80":81,"_82":83,"_84":85,"_86":87,"_88":89,"_90":91},"apiUrl","https://odel.app/api","creator","lacs-project","moduleId","sysknife","@lacs-project/sysknife","displayName","SysKnife","tagline","Administers Linux via typed, approval-gated actions with an Ed25519-signed audit trail.","iconKey","https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lacs-project/sysknife/main/assets/raster/sysknife-256.png","category","local","status","published","visibility","public","metaDescription","deploymentType","external","workerName","bindingName","mcpConfig","pricingModel","free","creatorUserId","system:external-import","createdAt",1785299577000,"updatedAt",1788669725000,"sourceRegistry","official-mcp-registry","sourceUrl","https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0/servers?search=io.github.lacs-project%2Fsysknife","sourceVerified",true,"sourceMissingSince","importedAt","upstreamStars",9,"upstreamUpdatedAt",1788630152000,"detectedTransport","detectedAuthType","probeStatus","lastProbedAt","githubRepoUrl","https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife","githubRepoFullName","lacs-project/sysknife","releaseId","ext-lacs-project-sysknife","version","0.13.1","descriptionMarkdown","

\n \n $\"SysKnife\"$ \n \n

\n\n

SysKnife

\n\n

\n Your sysadmin co-pilot. Plan. Approve. Audit.\n

\n\n

\n $\"CI\"$ \n $\"License\"$ \n $\"Stars\"$ \n $\"Issues\"$ \n $\"Discussions\"$ \n $\"npm$ \n $\"Glama$ \n

\n\n

\n Distros \n $\"Ubuntu$ \n $\"Ubuntu$ \n $\"Fedora$ \n

\n\n

\n Install ·\n How it works ·\n Why not X? ·\n Distro matrix ·\n Roadmap ·\n Contribute ·\n Discuss\n

\n\n

\n $\"SysKnife$ \n

\n\n

\n A deterministic reproduction of the Claude Code MCP flow on Ubuntu 24.04, rendered offline by\n ubuntu-flow-mock.sh so it replays identically from a\n fresh checkout. Every action name, risk level and command shown is the one the catalogue\n carries. The same flow works in Cursor and Codex CLI.
\n On an atomic host the plan uses rpm-ostree instead:\n the Fedora Atomic recording.\n Looking for the standalone CLI? See the CLI guide.\n

\n\n> **Describe what you want in plain language.** Review a typed plan with risk\n> levels. Approve explicitly. Watch it execute with live output. Atomic-host\n> changes (rpm-ostree) roll back automatically on failure. Every action is\n> Ed25519-signed and audited.\n\nThe AI never supplies a command. Every action is a **typed operation** with a\nformal risk level, and the daemon builds the command line itself from the\naction's own definition — some actions do run through `sh -c`, but the shell\nfragment is constructed by SysKnife, never by the model. The AI cannot touch\nyour system directly. A privileged daemon executes only what you approve, writes\na tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit chain, and rolls back atomic-host\n(rpm-ostree) changes automatically on failure.\n\n**Why typed actions and not a guarded shell?** Red-team research (GuardFall)\nfound that **10 of 11 AI agents bypass raw-string shell guards** — an allowlist\nor regex is filtering a language rich enough to hide intent. SysKnife removes\nthe shell string entirely: the model emits\n[typed actions](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/typed-actions.md), and a\n[public-key-verifiable audit chain](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/the-audit-chain.md) records every one.\n\n---\n\n## Install\n\nThe fastest path is the setup wizard. It installs the daemon and wires\nSysKnife into your AI IDE — Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI — so you can\nplan and execute from chat.\n\n```sh\nnpx sysknife-setup\n```\n\nNeeds **Node 18 or newer**. On Ubuntu 22.04 `apt install nodejs` gives Node 12,\nwhich is too old; the installer says so and how to get a current Node. No Rust\ntoolchain and no compile: it downloads verified prebuilt binaries.\n\n[![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/sysknife-setup?style=flat-square&logo=npm)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sysknife-setup)\n\nWhat this does:\n\n1. **Downloads the prebuilt `sysknife` + `sysknife-daemon` binaries** for your\n architecture (x86_64 / aarch64) from GitHub Releases, **SHA-256-verifies**\n each against the release checksum file — a mismatch aborts the install — and\n places them in `~/.local/bin` (no sudo). Pass `--no-binary` to skip the\n download and build from source instead.\n2. Asks for your **LLM provider, key, and model** — OpenAI / Anthropic / Gemini\n / Ollama / Groq / DeepSeek / Mistral / xAI (Ollama needs no key). The key\n prompt is skipped when the matching env var is already set.\n3. Asks **which AI integration** to wire up (or pick `--claude` / `--cursor` /\n `--codex` / `--all`) and your **daemon target(s)** — socket, plus an optional\n vsock token for a remote VM.\n4. **Writes the integration-specific MCP config** (merging into any existing\n file, never clobbering) so the next chat session sees the `sysknife_*` tools —\n `sysknife_plan`, `sysknife_execute`, `sysknife_history`, `sysknife_doctor`,\n `sysknife_audit_verify`, and distro-compatible direct read-only queries such\n as `sysknife_get_disk_usage` — as first-class tools.\n5. **Installs and starts the daemon as a service** (last step) — a systemd\n *user* service by default (no sudo; kept alive across logout via linger).\n That service runs as you, so read-only actions work but **mutating ones do\n not**: installing packages or restarting services needs the system-level\n service, whose sudoers grants belong to the `sysknife` system user. Pick the\n system service on any host where you intend to change something, and pass\n `--daemon-mode=system|user|skip` to choose without a prompt. `--daemon-mode=system`\n does not install the system service from the wizard — it needs root-owned\n sudoers, polkit and helper policy that `sudo make install` owns — so it prints\n the exact sequence and reports the daemon as not yet installed.\n\n To verify the download against a checksum list you trust independently of the\n release, set `SYSKNIFE_PINNED_SHA256SUMS=/path/to/sums`; see\n [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/SECURITY.md#release-artefact-trust).\n\n| Client | Files written |\n|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------|\n| **Claude Code** | `.mcp.json` + `.claude/hookify.*.local.md` |\n| **Cursor** | `.cursor/mcp.json` + `.cursor/rules/sysknife.mdc` |\n| **Codex CLI** | `~/.codex/config.toml` (appended) + `AGENTS.md` |\n\nThen in your chat: ask for what you want and review the plan with risk pills.\nApprove each transaction with `sysknife approve ` in a\nterminal, return the one-time receipts, and watch it execute. The daemon, not\nthe prompt, enforces the receipt boundary.\n\n> **Prefer the standalone CLI?** Same engine, no IDE — see the\n> [CLI guide](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/cli.md) for `sysknife \"...\"`, `--dry-run`, `--json`,\n> approval prompts, and audit-log inspection.\n\n

Manual install — Ubuntu 20.04+

\n\nNeeds Rust stable **and a C compiler** (`build-essential`): the TLS and SQLite\ndependencies build native code, so a rustup-only machine stops at\n`error: linker cc not found`. `cmake` is not required. Budget 7 to 12\nminutes for the ~400-crate build (6m56s on Ubuntu 24.04, 11m43s on 22.04).\n\n```sh\nsudo apt-get install -y build-essential\ngit clone https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife\ncd sysknife\nmake build # builds sysknife (CLI) + sysknife-daemon\nsudo make install # installs both; daemon runs as a system service\nsudo systemctl enable --now sysknife-daemon\n\n# Join the socket group and one role group, or every request is refused with\n# \"Permission denied\" before any role check runs: /run/sysknife is 0750\n# sysknife:sysknife, and a sudo admin is not in that group automatically.\n# Role groups: sysknife-observer (read-only), sysknife-dev (medium risk),\n# sysknife-admin (high risk). Members of wheel are treated as admin.\nsudo usermod -aG sysknife,sysknife-admin \"$USER\"\nnewgrp sysknife # or log out and back in\n\n# Then wire your IDE — --no-binary skips the download since you just built them\n# (--daemon-mode=skip: make install already set the service up)\nnpx sysknife-setup --no-binary --daemon-mode=skip\n```\n\n### Uninstall\n\nWhichever way you installed, there is one command for it.\n\n```sh\n# Removes what the wizard installed: the user service, the binaries in\n# ~/.local/bin, and the MCP + agent config in the current directory.\nnpx sysknife-setup --uninstall\n\n# See exactly what that would touch, without touching it.\nnpx sysknife-setup --uninstall --dry-run\n```\n\n**Your audit history is kept by default.** Removing the software should not\ndestroy the record of what it did, so the audit database, the safety-audit log\nand `~/.config/sysknife` are left in place and their paths printed. Delete those\ntoo, only if you mean to, with:\n\n```sh\nnpx sysknife-setup --uninstall --purge # names each file before deleting it\n```\n\nIf you installed the **system** service with `sudo make install`, remove it with\nthe Makefile that owns its sudoers grants, polkit rules and privileged helpers.\n`--uninstall` deliberately will not touch those, because half a removed\nprivilege boundary is worse than none:\n\n```sh\nsudo make uninstall\n```\n\nAll three Ubuntu LTS releases record a live-VM run of the 79-story Ubuntu\nsuite, and each run has a replay twin that reproduces it: 22.04, 24.04 and 26.04\nall at 79/79, every twin serving every call with zero misses. The runs are in\n`tests/evidence/story-runs/`. The suite grew from 50 when every Debian-only\naction got a story, `GetHostState` first.\nFedora Atomic is the rpm-ostree target; record a current Silverblue 44 VM run\nbefore treating a release as current-validated. Plain Fedora Workstation and\nServer remain experimental until the `dnf` action family ships. See the\n[`distro support matrix`](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/distro-support.md) for evidence and scope.\n

\n\n

Dry run — plan only, nothing executes

\n\n```sh\n# Requires the sysknife binary (see manual install above, or `npx sysknife-setup`).\n# Plans only: no daemon, no approval, no execution.\nexport ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...\nsysknife --dry-run \"show disk usage and list services that ate cpu in the last hour\"\n```\n

\n\n## Prefer the terminal? The CLI is a first-class path\n\nSame engine, no IDE and no MCP client — plain language to a typed plan to live\nexecution, straight from your shell, with `--dry-run`, `--json`, `--yes` up to a\nrisk ceiling, and `sysknife audit verify`. This is a fully supported way to run\nSysKnife, not an afterthought. See the [CLI guide](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/cli.md).\n\n

\n $\"sysknife$ \n

\n\n

\n A deterministic reproduction of a real planning and execution session, rendered offline by\n demo-mock.sh. Live LLM calls are nondeterministic and the\n tape has to render with no daemon or provider configured, so the recording is scripted rather\n than captured; the output styling is generated from the same code paths as the real CLI.\n

\n\n> **Also: a desktop GUI — development paused.** An experimental Tauri desktop\n> app (`sysknife-shell`) wraps the same plan → approve → execute loop in a\n> window. **Its development is paused for now**, and effort is going to Ubuntu\n> across its supported versions instead. The code stays in the tree and still\n> builds, but it is not being reviewed, tested, or extended, so reach for it\n> only if you specifically want a graphical approval flow and can live with\n> that. The MCP integration and the CLI are the maintained surfaces.\n\n## How it works\n\n```\nsysknife-brain → approval gate → sysknife-daemon\n (planner) (you, in a (executor)\n talks to LLM terminal) only privileged\n never to OS shows the plan, process; signs\n takes y/n every action\n```\n\nThe approval gate is a surface, not a component. In the maintained paths it is\n`sysknife approve ` in your terminal — for the CLI and for MCP\nalike, which is why an AI client cannot approve its own plan. The paused Tauri\nGUI (`sysknife-shell`) is a third implementation of that same gate, not a step\nthe other two route through.\n\n1. You type a natural-language request.\n2. The brain proposes a plan — each step is a **typed action** with\n a risk level (`Low` · `Medium` · `High`).\n3. The shell shows the plan with previews, side-effects, and rollback\n metadata.\n4. You approve each step explicitly (or set `--yes` up to a risk ceiling).\n5. The daemon executes, streams live output, rolls back automatically on\n high-risk failure.\n6. Every execution is logged to a hash-chained SQLite or Postgres audit\n trail you can verify with `sysknife audit verify`.\n\nThe brain *proposes*; only the daemon is privileged. The daemon *enforces*\npolicy, executes typed actions, writes the signed chain, and triggers\natomic-host rollback (rpm-ostree) on failure. The trust boundary is\nmechanical: no shell strings cross the wire.\n\n## Why not just X?\n\n| Tool | The gap |\n|---|---|\n| **Open Interpreter** | Runs arbitrary Python/Shell. No formal risk model. No audit chain. |\n| **Goose / Continue** | General-purpose. Ad-hoc confirmation, not typed risk levels. |\n| **Claude Computer Use** | Uncontrolled desktop automation, not system administration. |\n| **Ansible** | YAML written in advance. Not conversational. No risk classification. |\n| **shell-gpt / Copilot** | Suggests raw shell commands. You still run raw shell. |\n| **AIShell-Gate** | Closest peer, but proprietary and closed; audit is symmetric HMAC (the verifier holds the signing secret, so a proof convinces no one else). No rollback. |\n| **Manual** | No audit trail. No rollback. One typo = lost work. |\n\nSysKnife is different by construction: typed actions, an Ed25519-signed audit\nchain, explicit approval gate, automatic rollback for atomic-host (rpm-ostree)\nchanges, polkit-mediated privilege boundary. The AI never holds a shell. See the\nfull [SysKnife vs. alternatives](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/comparison.md) breakdown (AIShell-Gate,\ngate-oc-audit, MCP gateways, generic mcp-shell).\n\n## Status\n\nThe trust chain is built, tested, and shipping. Multi-distro is the active\nmilestone.\n\n| Component | State |\n|---|---|\n| `sysknife-brain` — LLM planner, tool loop, safety fence | ✅ |\n| `sysknife-daemon` — 190 typed actions, auth, preview, transactions | ✅ |\n| Live IPC + streaming + atomic-host rollback (rpm-ostree) | ✅ |\n| Terminal approval gate — one-time, TTL-bounded receipts | ✅ |\n| MCP server (Claude Code / Cursor / any MCP client) | ✅ |\n| Tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit chain | ✅ |\n| RFC 5424 syslog forwarding (Splunk / Sentinel / QRadar) | ✅ |\n| Postgres backend (RDS / Cloud SQL / Neon / Supabase) | ✅ |\n| **Ubuntu support** — 79/79 stories on a live 22.04 VM, recorded in `tests/evidence/story-runs/` | ✅ |\n| **Every Ubuntu LTS validated** — 22.04, 24.04 and 26.04 all at 79/79, each with a replay twin that reproduces it | ✅ |\n| Telegram approval interface | 📋 roadmap |\n\n**1,837 Rust tests and 72 frontend tests** form the current deterministic\nrelease baseline.\n\n## Configure your LLM\n\nSysKnife works with **Ollama** (no key, recommended for privacy / offline /\nhomelab) or **OpenAI**, **Anthropic**, **Gemini**, **Groq**, **DeepSeek**,\n**Mistral**, **xAI**.\n\n```toml\n# ~/.config/sysknife/config.toml\n[llm]\nprovider = \"ollama\" # or anthropic / openai / gemini / groq / ...\nmodel = \"qwen3:8b\" # provider-specific\nollama_url = \"http://localhost:11434\"\nmax_turns = 10\n\n[daemon]\nsocket = \"/run/sysknife/daemon.sock\"\ndatabase = \"/var/lib/sysknife/daemon.sqlite\"\n\n[storage] # production-recommended\nbackend = \"postgres\"\nurl = \"postgres://sysknife:${PG_PASSWORD}@db.example.com/audit?sslmode=verify-full\"\n```\n\nEnv vars always win over the config file. Full reference in\n[`docs/configuration.md`](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/configuration.md).\n\n## MCP protocol\n\nSysKnife implements the [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/)\nand exposes approval-gated planning and execution tools. `sysknife_plan`\nreturns a daemon-issued transaction ID for each step. After reviewing the\nplan, the user runs `sysknife approve ` in a real terminal and\ngives the one-time receipt to the agent. `sysknife_execute` rejects missing,\nexpired, mismatched, or replayed receipts. The MCP server cannot mint approval\nreceipts itself.\n\nUse the setup wizard (above) to wire it into Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI.\nAll config files that may contain API keys are created with `chmod 0600`.\n\n## Roadmap\n\nSee [ROADMAP.md](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/ROADMAP.md) for the full milestone breakdown.\n\n- ✅ **Ubuntu 22.04** — 79/79 stories on a live VM (recorded in `tests/evidence/story-runs/`)\n- ✅ **Ubuntu 24.04 and 26.04** — 79/79 and 79/79 on live VMs; every LTS run has a replay twin that reproduces it\n- ✅ `sysknife audit export` — stored signed chain rows as JSON with `--since` / `--limit`\n- 📋 Telegram inline-button approvals\n- 📋 CEF / NDJSON output modes for SIEM ingest\n- 📋 Fleet plan/execute (one plan, N targets, parallel approval)\n\n## Protocol\n\nSysKnife is the reference implementation of the **LACS (Linux Agent Control\nStandard)** protocol — typed actions, risk classification, approval gates,\naudit requirements. The spec is CC0 (public domain):\n\n→ **[lacs-project/specification](https://github.com/lacs-project/specification)**\n\nOther implementations for other distros and languages are explicitly\nencouraged.\n\n## Contributing\n\nWe want help. **Multi-distro** is the highest-impact area to plug into right\nnow — see [`docs/distro-support.md`](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/distro-support.md) for the\nroadmap matrix and [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) for the workflow.\n\nIssues labelled\n[`good first issue`](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/labels/good%20first%20issue)\nare scoped with clear acceptance criteria.\n\n### Thanks\n\nPatches so far from [@ITSMERNB](https://github.com/ITSMERNB),\n[@QinXi-ai](https://github.com/QinXi-ai), [@Osheun](https://github.com/Osheun),\n[@danial-razi](https://github.com/danial-razi),\n[@vsolano9](https://github.com/vsolano9) and\n[@Georgefifth](https://github.com/Georgefifth). Every release names who fixed\nwhat in [CHANGELOG.md](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md).\n\nIf you send a patch, watching\n[Releases](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/releases) is the quickest way\nto see it ship and to catch new `good first issue` entries as they land. A star\nhelps other people find the project.\n\n## Documentation\n\n- [Typed actions — why never a shell string](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/typed-actions.md)\n- [Action reference — every action, generated from the code](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/action-reference.md)\n- [The audit chain — Ed25519, public-key verifiable](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/the-audit-chain.md)\n- [Automatic rollback](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/automatic-rollback.md)\n- [SysKnife vs. alternatives](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/comparison.md)\n- [Architecture overview](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/architecture.md)\n- [Distro support matrix](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/distro-support.md)\n- [Configuration](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/configuration.md)\n- [Audit storage and recovery](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/storage-cloud.md)\n- [Developer guide](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/developer-guide.md)\n- [Testing guide](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/contributing/testing.md)\n- [VM daemon setup](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/vm-daemon-setup.md)\n- [Security policy](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/SECURITY.md)\n- [Release readiness checklist](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/release-readiness.md)\n- [Roadmap](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/ROADMAP.md)\n- [ADR 0001 — System boundaries](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/adr/0001-system-boundaries.md)\n- [ADR 0002 — Brain provider layer](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/adr/0002-brain-provider-layer.md)\n- [ADR 0003 — IPC wire protocol](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/adr/0003-ipc-wire-protocol.md)\n\n## Where to find SysKnife\n\n| Channel | Install | Notes |\n|---------|---------|-------|\n| **npm** | `npx sysknife-setup` | [npmjs.com/package/sysknife-setup](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sysknife-setup) — setup wizard; needs Node 18+, no compile |\n| **crates.io** | `cargo install sysknife-cli` / `cargo install sysknife-daemon` | Needs `build-essential`; ~7-12 min build. Published by reviewed version tags; see [docs/release.md](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/release.md) |\n| **MCP Registry** | `io.github.lacs-project/sysknife` | [registry.modelcontextprotocol.io](https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io) — resolves to the crates.io install above. Directory pages that sandbox a server list every tool but cannot call the ones needing the daemon; [docs/mcp-registry.md](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/docs/mcp-registry.md#what-a-directory-sandbox-can-and-cannot-tell-you) explains the split |\n| **GitHub Releases** | Download from [Releases](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/releases) | Prebuilt x86_64 + aarch64 binaries with SHA-256 checksums on every tag |\n\n## License\n\n[MIT](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/LICENSE). Free to use, modify, distribute, and embed in proprietary\nproducts without restriction.\n\nThe [LACS specification](https://github.com/lacs-project/specification) is\n[CC0 1.0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) — public domain.\n\n---\n\n

\n Built by Vladimir Rotariu.\n ·\n Issues, ideas, war stories — come say hi.\n

\n","changelogMarkdown","videoKey","requiredSecretsJson","publishedAt","priceCents","trialDays",0,"upstream",{"_109":110,"_111":112,"_113":114,"_115":116,"_117":118,"_119":120},"requiredSecrets",[],"tags",[94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108],"assets",[],"stats",{"_92":81,"_93":81},"ratingAvg","reviewCount","agentic-ai","ai-agents","ai-safety","audit-log","automation","claude","cli","devops","fedora","good-first-issue","help-wanted","linux","llm","rust","security","topics",[94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,126,127,107,108,128,129,130],"license","MIT","language","Rust","registryName","io.github.lacs-project/sysknife","homepage","https://lacs-project.github.io/sysknife/","packages",[121],{"_122":123,"_124":125,"_71":72},"registryType","cargo","identifier","sysknife-cli","mcp","model-context-protocol","sysadmin","systemd","ubuntu","ENV",{"_133":134,"_135":136,"_137":138},"ENVIRONMENT","production","TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY","0x4AAAAAAB8-rEI2gNDf_QhU","SENTRY_DSN","https://45fd1229f78089d5c3ee78be128030e1@o4510583261757440.ingest.de.sentry.io/4510584253448272"]