Odel
vouch

vouch

@notifuturoDeveloper Tools1TypeScriptMITUpdated 2w ago

Check if a counterparty is safe to pay: trust/risk score for AI agents. Scam/phishing screen.

Server endpointStreamable HTTP

This is the third-party server itself — Odel doesn't run it. Hitting this URL directly talks straight to the upstream server with no auth or proxying. Connect through Odel to front it with managed auth.

Vouch

CI License: MIT x402 Cloudflare Workers Live

A per-call payment trust & reputation API for AI agents — monetized over x402.

When an autonomous agent is about to pay a merchant, API, or counterparty, it asks Vouch one question first: is this safe to pay? Vouch returns an explainable trust score, and charges a fraction of a cent per call in USDC — no accounts, no API keys, no Stripe. Billing is the x402 protocol itself.

Why

The agentic-commerce rails (Coinbase x402, AWS, Visa, Mastercard, Agnic) are being built by giants. The governance layershould this agent trust this counterparty with money? — is the named #1 blocker to autonomous spend and is wide open. Vouch is a thin, self-serve pick-and-shovel on top of those rails.

Every call makes the product better: checks and community reports accrete into a reputation dataset that compounds with usage — the moat a bootstrapped team can actually build.

How it works

agent ──POST /v1/check { target }──▶  x402 paywall (402 → pay USDC → retry)
                                          │
                                          ▼
                          ┌─────────── scoring engine ───────────┐
                          │ transport · domain heuristics ·       │
                          │ threat feed · reputation (D1)         │
                          └───────────────────────────────────────┘
                                          │
                            { score, risk, reasons[] }

Scoring is a weighted average of independent signals, with a safety override: any single hard-negative signal (e.g. a threat-feed hit) caps the overall score so one strong red flag can't be averaged away.

SignalWeightSource
threat_feed3URLhaus host list (THREAT_FEED_URL), cached, fails open
reputation2Vouch's own accumulating D1 data (the moat)
transport1.5HTTPS / valid host
domain_heuristics1Punycode, raw IPs, abuse-prone TLDs, etc.

Endpoints

Method & pathCostDescription
POST /v1/checkx402 (USDC)Full verdict → { score, risk, reasons, signals, attestation } (signed Ed25519 receipt)
POST /v1/scorefree (rate-limited)Score + risk only → { score, risk }. Pay /v1/check for the reasons
GET /v1/attestation/pubkeyfreeEd25519 public key (JWK) to verify a /v1/check attestation
POST /v1/reportfreeSubmit a flag or vouch for a host
GET /v1/statsfreeAggregate reputation totals (hosts, checks, flags, vouches)
POST /mcpfreeMCP Streamable-HTTP server (vouch_score, vouch_report tools)
GET /healthfreeLiveness
GET /freeService info (HTML landing for browsers)

CORS is open (*) and the x402 payment headers are exposed, so browser-hosted agents can preflight and complete the pay/retry flow.

Reading /v1/report (abuse model)

POST /v1/report is free and unauthenticated by design — anyone can submit a flag or vouch for a host, so the raw flags/vouches counts are community signals, not ground truth. Abuse is contained by:

  • Rate limiting — 10 reports per 60s per client IP (Cloudflare Rate Limiting, fails closed).
  • Reporter-standing weighting — each counted report contributes a weighted amount (not a flat +1) based on the reporting source's tenure: a brand-new or anonymous source counts at 0.3, ramping to 1.0 only after ~7 days of sustained reporting. The scoring signal uses these weighted totals, so spinning up fresh sybil identities buys far less influence. A source can also move a given host's counter at most once per 24h (per-source de-dup); raw counts are still logged for audit.
  • Poisoning resistance in scoring — community reputation is a non-authoritative signal: it can lower a score but cannot, on its own, force a critical verdict. Only objective signals (threat feeds, transport) can hard-cap the score. So a burst of anonymous flags can't unilaterally brand a legitimate counterparty as unsafe.
  • Bounded inputtarget/reason/reporter are length-capped before storage.

Treat /v1/stats and report counts as a crowd-sourced prior that informs the paid verdict, not as an authoritative blocklist.

Stack ($0 to run)

TypeScript · Hono · Cloudflare Workers (free tier) · D1 (free SQLite) · @x402/* v2 · public facilitator at x402.org/facilitator.

Live on Base mainnet (X402_NETWORK=base, real USDC, $0.01/call). For local development, set X402_NETWORK=base-sepolia and fund a throwaway wallet from the free Circle faucet. The live network and price are authoritatively advertised at /.well-known/x402.

Develop

npm install
npm run typecheck
npm test

cp .dev.vars.example .dev.vars   # set PAY_TO_ADDRESS (your testnet wallet)
wrangler d1 create vouch         # paste database_id into wrangler.toml
npm run db:init                  # apply schema locally
npm run dev                      # local Worker

License

MIT — see LICENSE.