Self-hosted signing wallet: DIDs, agency grants, and task mandates for AI agents.
Runs on your machine from its package; the steps are below.
At most: moves money, runs code or commands, deletes data, or sends messages for you.
Odel charges nothing per call. The publisher may charge for its own service.
Runs locally over stdio
This server isn't hosted — your MCP client launches it from a package registry. Use one of the commands below, or drop the config into your client (e.g. Claude Desktop).
Run
npx -y @tamtunnel/si-wallet-mcp
MCP client config
{
"mcpServers": {
"sovereign-identity-wallet": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@tamtunnel/si-wallet-mcp"
]
}
}
}Sovereign-identity wallet as an MCP server. Gives any MCP-capable agent a DID, owner→agent grants, and task mandates — the identity layer underneath AWAS website authentication.
Protocol: TamTunnel/sovereign-identity — DIDs, agency grants, task mandates, and the AWAS website binding this wallet implements.
Version: 0.1.0 · License: Apache-2.0
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
wallet_onboard | Create the owner/agent identity (returns existing if present) |
wallet_did | Get the DID for a role |
issue_grant | Owner delegates scopes + USD limit to an agent DID |
mint_mandate | Agent mints a task mandate for a website audience (returns Authorization: Mandate … value). Pass subjectDid to delegate to a downstream agent with narrowed scope/amount |
verify_mandate | Website-side verification: signatures, expiry, audience, replay, grant binding, scope/amount confinement |
verify_chain | Website-side verification of a multi-hop delegation chain (Owner → … → agent): per-hop signatures, binding, attenuation, replay |
pairwise_did | Fresh pairwise DID per audience (no cross-site correlation) |
Guardrails are enforced server-side: mandates over $100 need
confirmOverLimit=true (only after the owner explicitly approved), and the
verifier rejects non-canonical base64url outright.
npm install -g @tamtunnel/si-wallet-mcp # after publish; or clone and npm install
export SI_WALLET_PASSPHRASE="your passphrase" # required for signing
si-wallet-mcp # stdio mode (default)
State lives in ~/.sov-id (override with SI_WALLET_DIR). Keys are
scrypt + AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest, files mode 600.
Add to the client's MCP config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"si-wallet": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/path/to/si-wallet-mcp/server.mjs"],
"env": { "SI_WALLET_PASSPHRASE": "your passphrase" }
}
}
}
Muse custom connectors reach remote MCP servers over streamable HTTP — a server on your laptop is not reachable from Meta's cloud. Run:
export SI_WALLET_PASSPHRASE="your passphrase"
export SI_MCP_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" # required in HTTP mode
si-wallet-mcp --http --port 8787
Expose it on a public HTTPS URL (your VPS, fly.io, Tailscale, …), then add
that URL as a custom connector in Muse with Authorization: Bearer <token>.
The server binds 127.0.0.1 by default; only set SI_MCP_HOST=0.0.0.0
behind TLS. Full walkthrough: DEPLOY.md.
docker build -t si-wallet-mcp .
docker run -d --name si-wallet \
-e SI_MCP_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
-e SI_WALLET_PASSPHRASE="your passphrase" \
-v si-wallet-data:/data \
-p 127.0.0.1:8787:8787 \
si-wallet-mcp
See DEPLOY.md for fly.io, Tailscale, TLS, onboarding, backups, and connecting Meta Muse.
examples/delegation-chain/ is a runnable proof that mandates compose
across agents and frameworks with no pair-specific connectors: the owner
grants Muse broad authority, Muse delegates a narrowed envelope to Hermes,
Hermes presents the leaf mandate to a website, and the website verifies the
whole attenuated chain. Four attacks (scope escalation, amount escalation,
tampering, replay) are attempted and refused.
node examples/delegation-chain/run.mjs
Each user hosts their own. That is the point. A wallet holds private keys, so there is no shared hosted instance — that would be custodial and would contradict the "sovereign" in sovereign identity.
verify_mandate without the replay ledger)
is the only piece that could ever be shared, and even that is safer local.Whoever can reach the server can ask it to sign. Treat the bearer token like a password and never expose the HTTP port without TLS.
SI_MCP_TOKEN; every request needs
Authorization: Bearer <token> (401 otherwise).