connectwise-cpq-mcp

MCP server for ConnectWise CPQ (Sell) — quotes, line items, customers, terms, tabs, templates, tax codes, recurring revenues, and users.

Built on the MCP 2026-07-28 spec via the split v2 SDK (@modelcontextprotocol/server / /node / /client ^2.0.0-beta.5) with dual-era serving: one shared McpServerFactory behind createMcpHandler({ legacy: 'stateless' }) answers both 2025-era initialize-handshake clients (the WYRE gateway today) and modern 2026-07-28 envelope clients — with an identical, deterministic 25-tool surface for every caller. Ships as a GHCR container only (no MCPB bundle).

Tools (25, flat)

Reads: cpq_test_connection, cpq_search_quotes, cpq_get_quote, cpq_get_quote_versions, cpq_search_quote_items, cpq_get_quote_item, cpq_list_quote_customers, cpq_search_quote_tabs, cpq_list_quote_terms, cpq_list_templates, cpq_list_tax_codes, cpq_list_recurring_revenues, cpq_list_users.

Writes: cpq_create_quote_from_template, cpq_update_quote (⚠ HIGH-IMPACT), cpq_create_quote_item, cpq_update_quote_item, cpq_update_quote_customer, cpq_create_quote_term, cpq_update_quote_term, and the ⚠ DESTRUCTIVE — IRREVERSIBLE deletes: cpq_delete_quote_item, cpq_delete_quote_term, cpq_delete_quote_customer, cpq_delete_quote_version, cpq_delete_quote.

Quote creation is copy-only (/api/quotes/copyById) — the CPQ API has no create-from-scratch, publish/e-sign, order-porting, PDF, or product-catalog endpoints (pair with connectwise-psa for those).

Credentials

CPQ requires an API user and CPQ 2022.2+. Three parts, all required:

In gateway mode a request missing any header is answered 401 (JSON-RPC error -32001) before the MCP handler runs — it never falls through to env credentials.

Copy .env.example for local configuration. Leave CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET empty in that file.

/health and /healthz stay unauthenticated and do not read credentials. The stdio transport does not use CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET.

HTTP authentication

With MCP_TRANSPORT=http and CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET set, every /mcp request must include X-Gateway-S2S. The check is verifyS2sHeader in src/s2s-verify.ts: the header value is t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex>, where the hex is HMAC-SHA256 of the literal string t=<unix seconds> keyed with CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET (64 lowercase hex characters). The timestamp must be within 300 seconds of the server clock. A missing or invalid header returns 401 before vendor credentials are read.

TS=$(date +%s)
SIG=$(printf 't=%s' "$TS" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" -hex | awk '{print $NF}')
curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
  -H "X-Gateway-S2S: t=${TS},v1=${SIG}" \
  -H 'X-CPQ-Access-Key: your-access-key' \
  -H 'X-CPQ-Public-Key: your-public-key' \
  -H 'X-CPQ-Private-Key: your-private-key' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}'

In AUTH_MODE=gateway those three X-CPQ-* headers are the only credential source for that request. With AUTH_MODE=env, a signed request uses CPQ_ACCESS_KEY, CPQ_PUBLIC_KEY, and CPQ_PRIVATE_KEY from the environment when the headers are absent.

Running

export NODE_AUTH_TOKEN=$(gh auth token)   # GitHub Packages auth for @wyre-ai/*
npm install
npm run build
node dist/index.js                        # stdio (default)
CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" MCP_TRANSPORT=http node dist/index.js
node scripts/smoke-dual-era.mjs           # proves both protocol eras serve the same tools

Local HTTP without a secret is development-only. It binds 127.0.0.1 (a non-loopback MCP_HTTP_HOST is overridden and logged) and logs a warning:

MCP_TRANSPORT=http MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 node dist/index.js

Local-dev note: @wyre-technology/node-connectwise-cpq is declared at ^1.0.0 but is not yet published; until the SDK's first release lands, npm ci from a fresh clone fails. Install the locally built SDK tarball instead: npm install /path/to/wyre-ai-node-connectwise-cpq-0.0.0-semantically-released.tgz (then keep package.json at ^1.0.0).

Docker (linux/amd64 per fleet law):

The image listens on 0.0.0.0 inside the container (MCP_HTTP_HOST) and defaults to AUTH_MODE=gateway. Publish the port on loopback and pass the S2S secret. In gateway mode, CPQ credentials arrive on each request as headers; they are not read from the environment.

docker build --platform linux/amd64 --build-arg GITHUB_TOKEN=$(gh auth token) \
  -t connectwise-cpq-mcp .
docker run \
  -e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
  connectwise-cpq-mcp

Compose refuses to start when CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is unset, defaults AUTH_MODE to gateway, publishes 127.0.0.1:8080:8080, and does not inject CPQ_ACCESS_KEY, CPQ_PUBLIC_KEY, or CPQ_PRIVATE_KEY:

export CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
GITHUB_TOKEN=$(gh auth token) docker compose up

Single-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires the S2S secret, then uses the CPQ_* variables:

docker run \
  -e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET \
  -e AUTH_MODE=env \
  -e CPQ_ACCESS_KEY=... \
  -e CPQ_PUBLIC_KEY=... \
  -e CPQ_PRIVATE_KEY=... \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
  connectwise-cpq-mcp

MCP Apps quote card

cpq_get_quote advertises a read-only MCP Apps card (ui://connectwise-cpq/quote-card.html) showing the quote header, status badges, a line-item summary, and totals. The card is purely additive: hosts without MCP Apps support get the full QuoteView JSON (the _card field is extra, never a replacement), and any card build failure leaves the JSON untouched. Rebuild the embedded UI with npm run build:ui (output committed at src/generated/quote-card-html.ts). Brand at serve time via MCP_BRAND_* env vars.

Elicitation and destructive-action consent

Where the connected client supports elicitation, the server asks before acting: date range on unfiltered quote searches, template pick on ambiguous names, tab pick when adding items, and confirmation before every delete. Elicitation rides the SDK v2 MRTR seam: handlers return input_required results (embedded elicitation/create requests) that 2026-07-28 clients fulfil and retry, and that the SDK's legacy shim fulfils server-side for 2025-era stateful connections (stdio). All elicitation is MRTR-safe: no vendor mutation ever fires before an elicitation point, so a client retry of the original request cannot duplicate a write.

Callers that never declared the form-elicitation capability — including stateless legacy HTTP requests, which is how the WYRE Conduit gateway connects — cannot be prompted at all. What that means depends on the stakes:

• Optional elicitation degrades gracefully (design.md §4): an unfiltered search falls back to a default 90-day range and says so, and the ambiguous template/tab pickers return an error listing the candidates.
• Destructive tools fail closed. A client that cannot answer has not consented, so the five cpq_delete_* tools refuse to run and return an actionable error naming what to do. A non-interactive caller opts in per call with "confirm_destructive_action": true, declared in each destructive tool's input schema so the gate is actually satisfiable. That argument is consulted only when no prompt is possible — it can never skip a confirmation an interactive user would otherwise have seen.

Vendor quirks encoded here

• Missing Authorization header → CPQ answers 500 (not 401); credentials are validated client-side before any request.
• The real 401 body carries a vendor typo ("...has occured during basic auth validation").
• Content-Type: application/json; version=1.0 on every request (media-type versioning).
• List responses are bare JSON arrays — pagination terminates on a short page.
• Condition dates must be date-only and bracketed: createDate >= [2026-07-01].
• PATCH bodies are RFC 6902 JSON Patch arrays.

License

Apache-2.0 © WYRE Technology