Non-custodial delegated-spending vaults on Kaspa L1 — for people and AI agents.

PolicyVault lets a vault owner hand a spending key to an agent — an employee, a service, a bot, or an AI agent — without handing over control of the funds. The spending policy is enforced by Kaspa L1 consensus through a covenant: even an agent who bypasses this entire application and talks directly to a Kaspa node cannot exceed the owner's policy.

The authority model, stated once and everywhere enforced:

AI MAY REQUEST. POLICYVAULT DETERMINISTICALLY DECIDES. THE COVENANT ENFORCES. SIGNERS RETAIN CUSTODY.

Production status (honest labels)

Surface	Status
Web / Agent platform	Service at https://app.policy-vault.org; served health identifies the active build. This tree corresponds to fullscale-rc45 build `1fa26b33`, the reconciliation and delegate period-start remediation successor of fullscale-rc44 (`df5b8de`).
Current production source	This tree is v1.10.11 (fullscale-rc45), image `sha256:32d45a3096b29eefc0dd97f2fc1e582ee00cb32236bbd7293c6626fd8bd4652d`; its published predecessor is v1.10.10. Preparation does not imply deployment; served health identifies the active build.
Organizational M-of-N owner root (covenant v0.7)	The existing RC40 mainnet generation policy is retained. This release does not change creation authority, covenant bytes or native-KAS status labels.
Rooted-vault owner operations in the browser (R7-05) + reservation/withdrawal guidance (F-6)	Retained; signing-threshold behavior is unchanged. Rooted-vault owner operations and approvals change in this release; the changelog's delegate period-start and organization-root items list the changes, among them: a delegate rule change of a `policyvault-0.7-kas` treasury must collect every owner approval and be finalized within the new or changed delegate's budget period minus ten minutes of the build (never less than one minute; 50 minutes for a 1-hour period), and the root request shows its finalize deadline; after it PolicyVault does not finalize the request, which can then only be withdrawn and built again (the web has no input for a later start), and such a request that was never attempted can be withdrawn although it carries owner approvals; a new delegate of a `policyvault-0.7-kas` treasury starts its budget period at the network position read when Build is pressed and an installed delegate's wallet on such a treasury is changed by removing and re-adding the delegate; a root request is refused when it spends an output that the node does not report unspent; hosted builds, finalize and broadcast on a treasury that Verify left UNRESOLVED are refused (an approval of an existing delegate request on it is still recorded but cannot reach the chain, and a withdrawal of a delegate request on it and a Verify of it still answer); Verify can attribute a root move broadcast outside PolicyVault to the recorded request whose transaction made it; and a finalized root request's Submit first reads its inputs and, after an input was spent by another transaction, the request can be withdrawn in two steps. Five served assets (`app-v4.js`, `app.js`, `kas-vault-ui.js`, `org-root-ui.js`, `refusal-explain.js`) change for v0.4-family Verify, request, delegate period-start, legacy-console and organization-root presentation.
Hosted tenancy for every route family + generation gate (rc11 remediation)	LIVE — closes the rc8 findings (unauthenticated hosted builds, prototype-derived version selection, unsafe mainnet creation of the non-standard v0.4 generation)
Post-launch live-stack review corrections (rc29: webhook target policy + DNS transport, SDK transport recovery key, legacy same-effect completion ownership, image/package LICENSE + NOTICE, privacy-safe runtime artifacts, recovery guidance)	IN THIS SOURCE and in the `fullscale-rc29` image — every finding of the independent read-only review of the running rc28 stack corrected RED-first with a permanent regression; the hosted deployment carries them once the served buildId reads `f217011`; installed SDK / mobile clients must upgrade for the transport correction
Second post-launch review corrections (rc30: webhook response-socket lifetime bound; upstream Silverscript ISC notice beside the compiler and the reference program)	IN THIS SOURCE and in the `fullscale-rc30` image — both findings of the independent read-only launch review of the running rc29 stack corrected RED-first with a permanent real-socket regression; the hosted deployment carries them once the served buildId reads `9dbc5f7`; no SDK / mobile client byte changed
Organization UI availability correction (rc31: organizational-root creation offered only where capability discovery advertises it; generation refusals say that address/amount changes cannot enable an unsupported mainnet generation; build errors scoped to the wizard)	IN THIS SOURCE and in the `fullscale-rc31` image — the owner-observed RC30 finding, corrected RED-first with a 13-case DOM regression that drives the real page and scripts (synthetic wallet, intercepted HTTP); browser presentation only — the server / SDK generation gates are unchanged and remain the authority; no SDK / mobile client byte changed
MCP package (`policyvault-mcp` on npm)	Unchanged `policyvault-mcp@1.6.2`, SHA256 `128403f81d4af7b73ae86a31a750d39ec21c28f518d214f4e678807c3dff0c14`. No genesis, signature or submission tool is exposed. Against this server, retrying the same MCP request after an uncertain outcome is refused (`IDEMPOTENCY_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN`, or `IDEMPOTENCY_IN_PROGRESS` after a server or store failure) or returns the retained result, instead of executing the operation again. The reject tool reports `403 REQUEST_FORBIDDEN` when the credential's wallet takes part in the vault but is neither the request's signer nor the vault owner. A delegate period start sent through MCP is a lower bound; `422 PERIOD_START_REQUIRED` reaches the caller as a `REFUSED` envelope (no MCP tool reaches the later checks that answer `409 PERIOD_START_STALE`).
Flagship wave 1 (v1.6.0 / v1.7.0) and wave 2 (v1.8.0) source	INCLUDED and LIVE where applicable (see their CHANGELOG entries; v0.6 stays FIXTURE VENUE ONLY / no mainnet swap; x402 facilitator PRODUCTION-READY, NOT deployed; MCP usage telemetry OFF)
Covenant protocol v0.6 (atomic composability)	COVENANT-BYTE-FROZEN (2026-09-03): VM-verified on the real engine with production bytes and testnet-verified (live testnet-10 SELL + BUY). FIXTURE VENUE ONLY — no real DEX venue, no mainnet swap, no server/web/mobile/MCP surface, `deadlineDaa` is a pre-sign boundary and not a consensus expiry, and swaps are not economically viable below roughly 10 KAS. PolicyVault is not a DEX and will not become one. See `docs/postlaunch/v0.6-covenant-byte-freeze.md`
v0.5 token-controller covenant (byte-frozen) + least-privilege discovery / console correctives + MCP 1.4.2 (v1.5.0)	LIVE — production runtime successor `fullscale-rc8` (buildId `1c02162`) deployed and automated-accepted on 2026-09-02: principal-scoped capability discovery, no dev-signer probe on production, zero privileged reads while signed out, opt-in wallet diagnostics; `policyvault-mcp@1.4.2` advertises only the tools a credential's scopes cover (server-side enforcement unchanged). The v0.5 TOKEN CONTROLLER covenant (`contracts/PolicyVault.v0.5.sil`, sha256 `c693aeff…`) ships as SOURCE — COVENANT-BYTE-FROZEN, VM-verified with production bytes and testnet-verified with one live lifecycle; NOT production (no v0.5 surface, no mainnet v0.5 vault). Illustrated onboarding walkthrough (presentation only). See CHANGELOG
Distribution: MCP registry, agent examples, self-hosting (v1.4.0)	Source/distribution release — NO runtime change (production keeps buildId `6c3177f`): the MCP server is npm/registry-packaged (`policyvault-mcp`, `io.github.zapsoblige-hash/policyvault`), thin OpenAI-Agents-SDK/LangChain/CrewAI wiring examples ship in `examples/agents/`, and one-command self-hosting ships in `deploy/selfhost.sh` + `docs/selfhost-quickstart.md`; see CHANGELOG
Bearer wallet-sessions + native mobile transport (v1.3.0)	LIVE: opt-in bearer wallet-session authentication for non-browser clients (authentication only — never signing authority or custody; cookie web auth unchanged), plus the native Android transport (explicit CapacitorHttp at the platform seam; no CORS widening, web client stays strict same-origin). The full bearer lifecycle was proven from the real packaged Android runtime against live production; see CHANGELOG
Responsive client + quiet signed-out UX (v1.2.0)	Faster signed-in navigation (retained state, parallel reads, truthful progress states — pending is never success) and no spurious signed-out error toasts; see CHANGELOG
Network-identity banner fix (v1.1.1)	The web client's network banner now derives from the server's node-verified `/network/status` and FAILS CLOSED to an explicit UNKNOWN state — never a stale or assumed network; see CHANGELOG
In-app documentation discovery (v1.1.0)	Docs link + contextual help in the web client, deep-linking to https://docs.policy-vault.org — presentation-only successor; see CHANGELOG
External-approver discovery fix (2026-08-27)	DEPLOYED + AUTOMATED-ACCEPTED (fail-closed availability defect, no funds/authority/privacy exposure; see CHANGELOG "Fixed". Acceptance was automated; no human acceptance test is claimed)
Covenant protocol v0.4.1	Mainnet-operational (real mainnet lifecycle evidence; see SECURITY.md for exactly what is proven and how)
Covenant protocol v0.5 (token controller)	COVENANT-BYTE-FROZEN (2026-09-02): VM-verified on the real engine with production bytes and testnet-verified (live testnet-10 lifecycle, consensus-rejected negatives); not production — no server/API/web surface, no mainnet instance; see `docs/postlaunch/v0.5-covenant-byte-freeze.md`
Python client, MCP server, x402/AP2 adapters, platform agent API	Shipped; covered by the automated conformance/integration suites in this repository
Native mobile (iOS/Android)	DEVELOPMENT — NOT YET PRODUCTION-CAPABLE. The Android app (full Capacitor project in `mobile/`, incl. the native production transport and bearer sign-in) has been validated on a real emulator against live production — reads, full bearer auth lifecycle, fail-closed negatives — but production signing, store packaging, and camera/QR capture remain pending; do not build custody workflows on it yet
Security assurance	INTERNAL and evidence-based only: independent internal AI falsification reviews of each exact candidate (the reviewer never repairs its own candidate), hostile / adversarial testing on the real Kaspa script engine with production bytes, RED-first reproduction with permanent regressions, production-shaped mechanical verification, live testnet-10 evidence, exact artifact and frozen-byte verification, and the owner's own live mainnet validation after each deployment. No external professional security audit has occurred and none is part of PolicyVault's process (owner policy, 2026-09-05); nothing in this repository claims otherwise

x402 FACILITATOR (integrations/x402-facilitator/, 2026-09-02): DESIGN FROZEN (owner-authorized; docs/postlaunch/x402-facilitator-design-freeze.md) · IMPLEMENTED · UNIT-TESTED · ADVERSARIAL-TESTED · INTEGRATION-TESTED (real HTTP service + real PostgreSQL claim store) · TESTNET-VERIFIED (real KAS + real frozen-v0.5 token payments on testnet-10; docs/testnet-x402-facilitator-evidence.json). A separately deployed, unprivileged, READ-ONLY chain verification / settlement attestation service for the proposed Kaspa scheme pv-x402-kaspa-exact-upfront/1 (network identifiers kaspa:mainnet / kaspa:testnet-10 are PolicyVault's provisional CAIP-2-syntax identifiers — no upstream registration is claimed). It never signs, broadcasts, escrows, or charges. NOT a hosted production service (a separate owner gate); no upstream Kaspa x402 scheme exists, so it is not "x402-compatible" without that qualification.

What the covenant enforces (consensus, not software)

Owner-controlled vaults — create, manage, pause, recover, close.
Delegated spending — up to 10 independent agents per vault, each with its own policy, spending real KAS within owner-defined limits.
Per-transaction caps and cumulative periodic budgets (DAA-score-based accounting verified by consensus).
Recipient allowlists — Merkle-committed; an agent can pay only owner-approved recipients.
M-of-N approvals above an owner-set threshold.
Covenant-controlled fee reserve — agents need no gas wallet; network fees come from a reserve the covenant accounts for exactly.
Break-glass owner pause and terminal recovery — never gated by any hosted workflow.

What the platform adds ABOVE the covenant (hosted coordination, not authority)

Intent manifests + independent browser verification — before any signature, the browser re-derives what the transaction does from the exact bytes to be signed and refuses on any mismatch (web/verify-intent.js, docs/postlaunch/intent-manifest-spec.md, docs/postlaunch/browser-verification.md).
Governance — proposal/approval ceremony (Schnorr-verified, domain-separated) for authority-expanding policy changes (docs/postlaunch/governance-spec.md).
Risk pipeline — restrictive-only configurable review/deny adapters (docs/postlaunch/risk-adapter-spec.md).
Budget reservations, hash-chained audit, webhooks/notifications, machine identities + scoped capabilities, idempotency, dry-run simulation (docs/postlaunch/*).
Universal Signer Interface with KasWare mapping and an offline CLI signer reference (docs/postlaunch/signer-interface-spec.md, signer-kasware-mapping.md, signer-cli-reference.md).
Agent surfaces: REST platform API, MCP server, Python client, x402 + AP2 payment-protocol adapters — all thin consumers of one deterministic core; none holds independent financial authority.

PolicyVault's API and shipped MCP tools provide scoped reads, supported simulations and unsigned requests. The MCP tools hold no signing keys and expose no signing or submission operation. PolicyVault's verification tools let an external signer check the exact operation before signing. The broader API supports attaching externally produced signatures and separately authorized submission; the browser also uses an external wallet. An authorized delegate, including an agent using an external wallet or signer, operates within covenant limits, permitted recipients, budgets and required approvals. Requesting, signing, submitting and verified on-chain acceptance are distinct stages. Kaspa consensus enforces the covenant.

Repository map

Path	What it is
`contracts/`	The covenant sources (v0.1…v0.6), regenerable byte-identically (`tools/gen_v3.js`, `gen_v4.js`, `gen_v4_1.js`, `gen_v5.js`, `gen_v6.js`)
`core/`	Portable deterministic core: model, intent manifests, explanations, governance, risk, signer (v1 + the additive v2 interface), execution attestations, cross-runtime equivalence
`sdk/`	The Node SDK: builders, freeze/sign/finalize, VM preflight, submission + chain proof, reconciliation, stores (JSON + PostgreSQL)
`server/`	Hosted runtime: API, auth/tenancy/request protection, governance/risk enforcement, audit chain, webhooks, notifications, attestation export, optional MCP telemetry (off), migrations 001–010
`web/`	Browser client + browser-local independent verification (`verify-intent.js`, `core-bundle.js`)
`mcp/`, `python/`, `integrations/`	MCP server, Python client, x402 + AP2 adapters
`conformance/`	One matrix driving JS + Python + MCP + x402 + AP2 through identical scenarios (cross-path byte equivalence)
`security/`	Internal adversarial (hostile-AI) test suites over the agent-facing boundaries
`mobile/`	Native mobile app (Capacitor Android project + portable web payload, native production transport, bearer sign-in) — DEVELOPMENT status (see above)
`tests/vm/`	Real Kaspa VM covenant verification workspace (Rust; TxScriptEngine)
`deploy/`	Container build + staging/production/self-host compose examples + env templates + the reproducible deployment pipeline (`deploy/pipeline/`, local proof only)
`docs/`	Protocol specs, architecture, threat model, invariants, hosted design, per-surface specs, covenant freeze records
`tools/`, `release-signers.json`	Covenant generators, acceptance harnesses, the attestation verifier, and the release manifest/sign/verify tooling (the signer public key is an unfilled `OWNER-TO-FILL` placeholder; no release has been signed)

Quick start (self-hosted, testnet-10)

bash

# prerequisites: Node 20.x; a local Kaspa testnet-10 node with --utxoindex
#   (rusty-kaspa; JSON wRPC on ws://127.0.0.1:18210)
cd sdk && npm ci && npm test          # the SDK suite (serialized)
cd ../server && node src/server.js    # self-hosted mode, JSON persistence
# open http://127.0.0.1:3080 — connect a testnet KasWare wallet

Full instructions, including PostgreSQL-backed hosted mode, container builds, covenant regeneration + byte-identity verification, and the VM suite: docs/deployment.md, docs/hosted-deployment.md, docs/test-plan.md. The VM workspace expects sibling checkouts of the public silverscript and rusty-kaspa projects (see tests/vm/ and tools/stage-vendor.sh).

Product policy (permanent)

Free software and self-hosting — Apache 2.0, including commercial use. Official hosted access is currently free. Kaspa network transaction fees still apply. No patents on the protocol or its mechanisms. Voluntary KAS donations support continued development and hosting: kaspa:qyppakv5y7kmeynffldl9zshwgkjrl3fy9jjj8wf24v7f64v0gnuragz7ehdqhn (public receiving address; nothing in this software ever asks for or handles donation-wallet keys). Details: docs/product-policy.md.

Security

Read SECURITY.md for the security model, the exact claim → enforcement → test → evidence discipline, what is PROVEN versus DESIGN TARGET, and how to report vulnerabilities.