Industrial-AIOps

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Ask an AI agent why the line stopped — and get an answer that cites its evidence.

A vendor-neutral, read-first data tap for the factory floor. It speaks 14 field protocols, correlates what it reads across them, and hands your agent an evidence-cited verdict instead of a guess. Every call is audited, and no reading ever phones home.

bash

pip install "iaiops[opcua]"      # pick your protocol — or [all]
iaiops init                      # write ~/.iaiops/config.yaml
iaiops doctor                    # check the setup before you trust it

Prefer a container? The published image is cosign-signed and runs non-root. It speaks MCP over stdio, so keep stdin open and mount a volume for the audit store:

bash

cosign verify --key deploy/margo/cosign.pub ghcr.io/industrial-aiops/iaiops:0.28.0-factory
docker run -i --rm -v iaiops-state:/home/iaiops/.iaiops \
  ghcr.io/industrial-aiops/iaiops:0.28.0-factory

For a hardened or air-gapped deployment (read-only rootfs, cap_drop: ALL, no-new-privileges, optional on-box LLM) use deploy/margo/compose.yaml and deploy/airgap/. The analysis engine needs no GPU and no model API — it is deterministic; an LLM is optional and only phrases the verdict.

What you get


Reads	OPC-UA (+ Historical Access, tag auto-discovery) · Modbus TCP/RTU · S7comm · Mitsubishi MC · Omron FINS · MTConnect · MQTT/Sparkplug B · EtherNet/IP · EtherCAT · PROFINET · SECS/GEM · HART-IP · BACnet/IP · IO-Link — plus read-only REST layers for BAS supervisors (Metasys / Niagara) and Ignition Gateway
Figures out	downtime root cause (the flagship copilot), alarm floods (ISA-18.2), broken dataflows, data trustworthiness, OEE, asset inventory, legacy PLC program explainer (ST/AWL/L5X)
Governs	audit · budget · risk-tier · undo — on every call, through one engine, from both MCP and CLI
Stays yours	no telemetry, no phone-home. Six tools can send data off-box by design (`stream_publish`, `stream_publish_event`, `uns_publish`, `historian_push`, `mqtt_publish`, `rca_narrate`) — `IAIOPS_NO_EGRESS=1` withholds all six for an air-gapped posture

Ten per-industry editions ship in this package — fab · factory · process · building · water · warehouse · clinical · pharma · renewables · plcnext — each adding its own read-only advisory checks. Substation / utility telecontrol (IEC-104 · DNP3 · IEC-61850) ships separately as iaiops-energy.

Your first five minutes

Four commands. Only one of them touches a device, and it prints what it will send before it sends anything.

bash

pip install "iaiops[modbus]"     # pick the protocol you actually have, or [all]
iaiops onboard status            # ← run this first. Contacts NOTHING.
iaiops doctor                    # config, secrets, reachability — and the version
iaiops readiness                 # every scenario, and what each gap needs

onboard status answers the smaller questions you have first: which journey is this site on — reading its devices directly, or subscribing to a UNS broker its data already flows through — which step of it are you on, and what is the one command that advances it? It is derived from your store and config.yaml every time. The one thing it keeps is a namespace audit verdict, and that counts only for the broker and topic filter it was taken on and always shows its age — so edit config.yaml by hand and the answer stays true.

readiness reads your config and local store and answers one question: which scenarios can this site run today, and what does each gap need? Every gap comes with the command that closes it, ranked by how much it unlocks. No agent, no cloud, no account, and nothing on the wire.

Then the path, in the order that matters — survey what is there, take a bounded sample, and only then explain it:

		contacts a device?
Survey	`iaiops scan plan` → `iaiops scan run`	preview sends nothing; the run itemises every packet class it sent
Configure	`iaiops onboard draft` → you merge it into `config.yaml`	no — it reads the stored scan, and writes nothing
Tap	`iaiops collect run line1 --duration 7d`	yes — and it reports what it saw and what it missed
Declare	`iaiops tags export` → a person fills in `role` → `iaiops tags apply --by <you>`	no — the `role` column comes out empty on purpose
Explain	`iaiops oee measure --since … --until …` · `iaiops investigate open` · `iaiops diag rca`	no — all over collected history

See the whole thing run against a real device in about two minutes, including a genuine mid-run outage, with ./demo/oee-line/run_demo.sh — no hardware, no configuration, nothing written outside a temporary directory. demo/oee-line/ explains what each step is for and what the numbers do and do not claim.

Why read-first

OT is exactly where you want an agent on a tight leash. The read paths are the product; the few write paths are OT-dangerous, off by default, and gated by MOC discipline — dry-run, one-shot approval, undo capture, hash-chained audit.

Proving the analysis needs no model

The analysis layers cannot reach a language model. That is a guard, not a slogan: tests/test_brain_is_llm_free.py scans eight packages — brain, discovery, runtime, readiness, collect, knowledge, retain, connectors — for any import that could reach one, and an empty result is the guarantee. A model is used in exactly two places, and neither is load-bearing: rca_narrate rephrases a verdict that was already computed and already cited, and an agent front-end decides which tool to call. Remove both and the numbers are the same numbers.

That guard is static — it proves nothing can call a model. For a validation team the sentence they are asked to accept is the executed one, so it is executed:

bash

iaiops verify determinism --out determinism-record.json

A pinned in-repo dataset goes through availability, production counts, the Six Big Losses, ISA-18.2 alarm load, control charts, the conservative baseline and the RCA copilot. Each result is canonically encoded and digested; the suite runs twice in this process and once in each of two fresh interpreters started at different PYTHONHASHSEED values — the arm that catches a set or dict iteration order reaching a result, which a single run never can. The socket API raises throughout, so a computation that reached for a device or a hostname fails here instead of quietly working on a machine that happened to be online. Afterwards the run is asked what it pulled in: a model library that was already loaded (an MCP server holds iaiops.core.llm for the opt-in narration tool) is recorded, not judged — only what the suite itself imported can condemn it.

The record separates result (identical every run — the part to sign) from context (when and where this run happened). Two good runs are not byte-identical records, and someone will diff them, so the halves are named rather than mixed.

This is the form the claim has to take to be usable: not "our model is accurate", which is not evidence in a GxP context, but a test case someone can write into an IQ/OQ protocol — remove the model, block the network, re-run the standard dataset, compare the hash — execute, and sign. verify_determinism is the same check from the MCP side; iaiops verify suite lists what it covers without running it.

How far it's actually been verified

Short version: verified against real protocol libraries, containers and in-process servers — not yet against real plant gear. We grade evidence rather than saying "tested", because a real container round-trip and a synthetic fixture are not the same claim.

Rung	Who judges our frames	Protocols at this rung today
2a — real wire to a third-party server	somebody else's implementation of the spec	OPC-UA (Microsoft `opc-plc`; certificate trust enforced both ways) · Modbus TCP (`pymodbus`) · Modbus RTU (`pymodbus` over a `socat` PTY) · MQTT / Sparkplug B (a real `mosquitto` broker) · BACnet/IP (`bacpypes3`, two IPs on one subnet) · MTConnect (the Institute's own `cppagent`) · SECS/GEM (`secsgem` equipment side) · EtherNet/IP (identification)
2b — real wire to a server we wrote from the spec	the third-party client parses our frames	S7comm (`pyS7`) · Mitsubishi MC (`pymcprotocol`) · EtherNet/IP (tag layer — `pycomm3`, all three driver routes) · PROFINET-DCP
2c — real wire, but both ends are ours	nobody independent	Omron FINS · IO-Link · HART-IP (codec itself at rung 1, against `hart-protocol`)
mock only — protocol logic exercised, nothing on the wire	—	EtherCAT · BAS (Metasys / Niagara) · Ignition gateway
3 — real physical / vendor device	the device	zero, for every protocol

Each row's detail — and, per protocol, what is still not covered — is in docs/VERIFICATION-RECORD.md. That file is the record; this table is its summary, and a test fails if the two disagree.

Per-protocol evidence — including what each test does not cover — is in docs/VERIFICATION-RECORD.md, one row per protocol, naming the test behind each claim. Every 待核实 is hardware-gated, not forgotten — each one names the equipment that would settle it.

🧪 测试与共创 / Beta testing & co-creation

我们在找现场测试伙伴。 软件里能验证的我们都验证了（真实 in-process 服务器、真实协议库、Docker 容器 loopback）——剩下的 待核实 清单只有真设备能回答：物理 Modbus-RTU（RS-485）、EtherCAT 从站、HART 网关、在线 BACnet 楼宇设备、在线 Metasys/Niagara BAS 控制器、在线 Ignition 网关、国产 PLC（汇川/信捷）、真机 PLCnext、真实变电站 RTU/IED、欧姆龙 FINS 真机、IO-Link 主站。如果你是 OT 工程师、系统集成商或工厂团队，手上有任何这类设备：装上 iaiops，对你的设备跑一遍 iaiops doctor，把结果告诉我们。经你验证的设备会署名写进支持矩阵；现场反馈的问题我们优先分诊；功能可以通过 GitHub Issues/Discussions 直接共创。

We're looking for field-testing partners. Everything software-verifiable has been verified; what's left on the honest 待核实 list only real equipment can answer — physical Modbus-RTU (RS-485), EtherCAT slaves, HART gateways, live BACnet HVAC, live Metasys/Niagara BAS controllers, live Ignition gateway, domestic PLCs (Inovance/Xinje), live PLCnext, substation RTUs/IEDs, live Omron FINS PLCs, IO-Link masters. If you're an OT engineer, integrator, or factory team with access to any of these: install iaiops, run iaiops doctor against your gear, and tell us what happened. Verified-equipment reports get credited in the support matrix, field-reported issues get fast triage, and features are co-designed in the open via GitHub Issues/Discussions.

👉 参与入口 | Start here: open an issue with the protocol and device model in the title, or email zhouwei008@gmail.com. Either reaches a person, and a report gets answered against the current release.

Consolidated capability matrix

Protocol	Tool	Operation	R/W	risk_tier	Returns (key fields)
OPC-UA	`opcua_server_info`	server status	R	low	state, product_name, namespaces
OPC-UA	`opcua_browse`	browse node tree	R	low	[{node_id, browse_name, depth}]
OPC-UA	`opcua_read_node`	read one node	R	low	value, datatype, source_timestamp, good
OPC-UA	`opcua_read_many`	batch read	R	low	[{node_id, value, ...}]
OPC-UA	`opcua_subscribe_sample`	bounded sample	R	low	{collected, samples[]}
OPC-UA	`opcua_read_alarms`	alarm surfacing	R	low	{active_alarms[], active_count}
OPC-UA	`opcua_read_history`	Historical Access (HDA)	R	low	{supported, count, values[]}
OPC-UA	`opcua_diagnose_connection`	connection triage	R	low	{verdict, checks[]}
OPC-UA	`opcua_discover_tags`	tag auto-discovery → semantic asset model	R	low	{tag_count, assets[], naming_report}
OPC-UA	`opcua_health_summary`	threshold classify (was `health_summary`¹)	R	low	{overall, counts, offenders[]}
OPC-UA	`opcua_anomaly_scan`	stddev outliers (was `anomaly_scan`¹)	R	low	{mean, stddev, outliers[]}
Modbus	`modbus_read_holding`	FC03	R	low	{raw_registers, decoded[]}
Modbus	`modbus_read_input`	FC04	R	low	{raw_registers, decoded[]}
Modbus	`modbus_read_coils`	FC01	R	low	{bits[]}
Modbus	`modbus_read_discrete`	FC02	R	low	{bits[]}
Modbus	`modbus_detect_byte_order`	byte/word-order auto-detect	R	low	{best_order, candidates[]}
Modbus	`modbus_list_templates`	vendor register templates	R	low	{templates[]}
Modbus	`modbus_apply_template`	decode block via template	R	low	{values:{name: engineering_value}}
Modbus	`modbus_health_summary`	threshold classify	R	low	{overall, counts, offenders[]}
S7comm	`s7_cpu_info`	CPU id + run/stop	R	low	{cpu_status, cpu_info}
S7comm	`s7_read_area`	read DB/M/I/Q	R	low	{items:[{address, value}]}
S7comm	`s7_read_db`	read data block	R	low	{items:[{address, value}]}
S7comm	`s7_read_many`	batch addresses	R	low	{items:[{address, value}]}
S7comm	`s7_write_db`	write data block	W	high/MOC	{before, written, _undo_id}
Mitsubishi MC	`mc_cpu_status`	CPU type	R	low	{cpu_type, cpu_code}
Mitsubishi MC	`mc_read_words`	word devices	R	low	{words[]}
Mitsubishi MC	`mc_read_bits`	bit devices	R	low	{bits[]}
Mitsubishi MC	`mc_read_many`	random read	R	low	{words[], dwords[]}
Mitsubishi MC	`mc_write_words`	write words	W	high/MOC	{before, written, _undo_id}
Omron FINS	`fins_cpu_info`	controller data read (0501)	R	low	{controller_model, controller_version}
Omron FINS	`fins_cpu_status`	controller status (0601)	R	low	{run_mode, status}
Omron FINS	`fins_read_words`	memory-area word read (DM/CIO/W/H/A/EM)	R	low	{words[]}
Omron FINS	`fins_read_bits`	memory-area bit read	R	low	{bits[]}
Omron FINS	`fins_read_many`	batch reads	R	low	{items[]}
Omron FINS	`fins_write_words`	memory-area write	W	high/MOC	{before, written, _undo_id}
MTConnect	`mtconnect_probe`	device model	R	low	{devices:[{components:[{data_items}]}]}
MTConnect	`mtconnect_current`	latest values	R	low	{observations[]}
MTConnect	`mtconnect_sample`	bounded stream	R	low	{observations[]}
MTConnect	`mtconnect_assets`	assets	R	low	{assets[]}
MTConnect	`mtconnect_oee_snapshot`	OEE inputs	R	low	{availability, execution, verdict}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`mqtt_read_topic`	bounded read	R	low	{messages:[{topic, payload}]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`sparkplug_subscribe_sample`	bounded SpB sample (full decode)	R	low	{samples:[{sparkplug, payload:{metrics[]}}], seq_gap_count}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`sparkplug_decode_payload`	decode raw SpB payload	R	low	{metrics:[{name, alias, datatype, value, is_historical}]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`sparkplug_node_list`	node discovery + state	R	low	{nodes:[{group_id, edge_node_id, online, devices}], primary_hosts[]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`uns_browse`	topic-tree browse	R	low	{topics[], tree{}}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`uns_topic_audit`	UNS naming + sprawl governance	R	low	{verdict, sprawl_findings, findings{casing_collisions[], scattered_leaves[], …}}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`uns_schema_drift`	Sparkplug schema-drift (baseline vs current)	R	low	{verdict (none/additive/breaking), node_changes[]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`uns_live_audit`	live UNS audit (bounded broker sample)	R	low	{verdict, findings{}}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`sparkplug_live_schema`	live NBIRTH schema snapshot	R	low	{nodes[], metrics[]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`uns_live_drift`	live drift vs stored baseline	R	low	{verdict, node_changes[]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	`mqtt_publish`	publish/command	W	high/MOC	{published_bytes, applied}
EtherNet/IP	`eip_controller_info`	Logix controller id	R	low	{controller:{vendor, product_name, revision, serial}}
EtherNet/IP	`eip_list_tags`	tag discovery	R	low	{tag_count, tags:[{name, data_type, structure}]}
EtherNet/IP	`eip_read_tag`	read one tag/array	R	low	{tag, value, type, good}
EtherNet/IP	`eip_read_many`	batch read	R	low	{items:[{tag, value, type}]}
EtherNet/IP	`eip_write_tag`	write tag	W	high/MOC	{before, written, _undo_id}
Diagnostics	`diagnose_dataflow`	localize no-data	R	low	{verdict, diagnosis, hops[]}
Diagnostics	`alarm_bad_actors`	ISA-18.2 flood	R	low	{flood_verdict, top_offenders[]}
Diagnostics	`tag_health`	offender ranking	R	low	{overall, offenders[]}
Diagnostics	`historian_health`	gap/flatline	R	low	{verdict, gaps[]}
Diagnostics	`subscription_health`	sequenced-feed loss/reorder/overload	R	low	{verdict, missed_count, overloaded_channels[]}
Diagnostics	`downtime_root_cause`	AI downtime RCA copilot (cited, advisory)	R	low	{verdict, primary_cause, hypotheses:[{cause, confidence, evidence[]}]}
Diagnostics	`downtime_root_cause_live`	RCA copilot that gathers its own live evidence	R	low	{…downtime_root_cause…, collected_evidence}
Diagnostics	`learn_cause_weights`	learn per-site RCA cause weights from labeled incidents	R	low	{cause_weights{}, rationale}
Diagnostics	`data_quality_scorecard`	fleet data-trust rollup	R	low	{fleet_score, fleet_status, issue_breakdown, worst_tags[], endpoints[]}
Diagnostics	`data_quality_fleet_rollup`	cross-endpoint fleet view	R	low	{fleet_score, endpoints[]}
Diagnostics	`heartbeat_health`	heartbeat/watchdog liveness	R	low	{alive, distinct_transitions, longest_stall_s, reason}
Alarm (ISA-18.2)	`alarm_flood_analysis`	flood episodes / chattering / stale / summary	R	low	{episodes[], chattering[], stale[], summary{}}
Alarm (ISA-18.2)	`alarm_rationalization_worksheet`	CSV-exportable rationalization rows	R	low	{rows[], csv_path?}
Baseline	`baseline_learn`	conservative change-log baseline (refuses thin history)	R	low	{band{p1,p99,median,mad} \| insufficient_data}
Baseline	`baseline_check`	silent-by-default violation check	R	low	{status, violations[] (cited)}
Baseline	`baseline_record_change`	record operator change (restarts learning)	R	low	{recorded, change_point}
Baseline	`baseline_status`	no_baseline / learning / ok / violation	R	low	{status, window}
Historian	`historian_query`	read history back out of sqlite/TDengine/IoTDB	R	low	{rows[], truncated}
Historian	`historian_coverage`	per-tag row counts + first/last ts	R	low	{tags:[{tag, rows, first, last}]}
PLC program	`plc_program_outline`	structure of exported ST/AWL/L5X program	R	low	{blocks[], call_graph, timers[]}
PLC program	`plc_program_xref`	symbol/address cross-reference (cited lines)	R	low	{sites:[{kind, source_file, line, quote}]}
PLC program	`plc_program_section`	one named block's source (≤200 lines)	R	low	{text, source_file}
Export	`export_data`	export local store → CSV/SQLite/Parquet	R	low	{path, row_count, preview[]}
Analytics	`oee_compute`	OEE = A×P×Q	R	low	{availability, performance, quality, oee, oee_pct}
Analytics	`downtime_events`	stoppage detect + categorize	R	low	{event_count, total_downtime_s, by_category, events[]}
Analytics	`oee_multidim`	OEE machine×part×shift	R	low	{matrix[], worst_performers[], mean_oee}
Analytics	`asset_inventory`	active fingerprint	R	low	{assets:[{protocol, vendor, model, firmware, reachable}]}
Analytics	`cross_protocol_asset_model`	merge discovered tags into one asset model	R	low	{assets[], tag_count}
Analytics	`adopt_alias_map` / `diff_alias_map`	tag alias-map adopt/diff	R	low	{aliases{}, changes[]}
Analytics	`monitor_changes`	bounded change-of-value	R	low	{change_count, changes:[{value, previous, wall_clock}]}
EtherCAT	`ethercat_master_state`	master/WKC + slave count	R	low	{master_state, expected_working_counter, slaves_found, slaves_expected}
EtherCAT	`ethercat_slaves`	bus scan	R	low	{slave_count, slaves:[{index, name, vendor_id, product_code, state}]}
EtherCAT	`ethercat_slave_info`	slave detail	R	low	{sync_managers[], fmmus[], object_dictionary[], input_bytes}
EtherCAT	`ethercat_read_sdo`	CoE SDO upload	R	low	{index, byte_length, hex, as_uint}
EtherCAT	`ethercat_read_pdo`	input PDO snapshot	R	low	{working_counter, input_hex, input_byte_length}
EtherCAT	`ethercat_write_sdo`	CoE SDO download	W	high/MOC	{before, written, applied}
EtherCAT	`ethercat_set_state`	AL-state transition	W	high/MOC	{before, requested, reached, applied}
PROFINET	`profinet_discover`	DCP IdentifyAll (segment-wide)	R	low	{station_count, stations:[{name_of_station, mac, ip, vendor_id, device_roles[]}]}
PROFINET	`profinet_identify_station`	identify by name-of-station	R	low	{found, name_of_station, mac, ip, device_family}
PROFINET	`profinet_station_params`	targeted DCP Get (by MAC)	R	low	{found, name_of_station, ip, netmask, gateway}
PROFINET	`profinet_asset_inventory`	DCP asset register	R	low	{asset_count, io_controller_count, assets[]}
PROFINET	`profinet_dcp_set`	DCP Set (station name / IP suite)	W	high/MOC	{before, applied, _undo_id}
SECS/GEM	`secsgem_equipment_status`	GEM link + identity (S1F1/F2)	R	low	{communication_state, are_you_there}
SECS/GEM	`secsgem_list_status_variables`	SVID namelist (S1F11/F12)	R	low	{count, status_variables[]}
SECS/GEM	`secsgem_read_status_variables`	SVID values (S1F3/F4)	R	low	{svids, values[]}
SECS/GEM	`secsgem_list_equipment_constants`	ECID namelist (S2F29/F30)	R	low	{count, equipment_constants[]}
SECS/GEM	`secsgem_read_equipment_constants`	ECID values (S2F13/F14)	R	low	{ecids, values[]}
SECS/GEM	`secsgem_list_alarms`	alarm list (S5F5/F6)	R	low	{count, alarms[]}
SECS/GEM	`secsgem_list_process_programs`	PPID directory (S7F19/F20)	R	low	{count, process_programs[]}
BACnet (building)	`bacnet_discover`	Who-Is device discovery	R	low	{device_count, devices:[{device_id, address}]}
BACnet (building)	`bacnet_object_list`	a device's objects	R	low	{object_count, objects:[{object_type, instance}]}
BACnet (building)	`bacnet_read_property`	one object property	R	low	{object_type, instance, property, value}
BACnet (building)	`bacnet_read_points`	all present-values (HVAC snapshot)	R	low	{point_count, points:[{object_type, instance, present_value}]}
BACnet (building)	`bacnet_cov_subscribe`	bounded COV capture (always unsubscribes)	R	low	{notifications[], terminated_reason}
BACnet (building)	`bacnet_read_trend_log`	TrendLog readRange (bounded)	R	low	{records:[{timestamp, value}]}
BACnet (building)	`bacnet_write_property`	present-value write (priority)	W	high/MOC	{before, written, _undo_id}
HART-IP (process)	`hart_device_identity`	cmd 0 identity	R	low	{manufacturer, device_type, revision}
HART-IP (process)	`hart_primary_variable`	cmd 1 PV	R	low	{value, unit}
HART-IP (process)	`hart_dynamic_variables`	cmd 3 PV/SV/TV/QV + loop current	R	low	{variables[], loop_current}
HART-IP (process)	`hart_burst_sample`	bounded burst-variable sampling	R	low	{samples[]}
IO-Link	`iolink_master_info`	master identity	R	low	{vendor, product, serial}
IO-Link	`iolink_ports`	≤32-port sweep (mode/status/device id)	R	low	{ports[]}
IO-Link	`iolink_device_info`	per-port device identity	R	low	{vendor_id, device_id, product_name}
IO-Link	`iolink_read_pdin`	process-data-in (raw hex + bytes)	R	low	{hex, bytes[]}
IO-Link	`iolink_read_isdu`	ISDU acyclic parameter read	R	low	{index, subindex, value}
IO-Link	`iolink_scan`	master + all connected devices	R	low	{master{}, devices[]}
BAS (Metasys/Niagara)	`bas_point_list`	supervisory point directory	R	low	{point_count, points:[{id, name, type}]}
BAS (Metasys/Niagara)	`bas_point_read`	read one supervisory point	R	low	{point, value, unit, status}
BAS (Metasys/Niagara)	`bas_alarm_list`	active controller alarms	R	low	{alarm_count, alarms:[{id, priority, state}]}
BAS (Metasys/Niagara)	`bas_trend_read`	trend/history samples (bounded)	R	low	{records:[{timestamp, value}]}
BAS (Metasys/Niagara)	`bas_command`	supervisory command (default-OFF; life-safety object denylist refuses fire/smoke/egress/pressurization before any I/O)	W	high/MOC	{before, written, _undo_id}
Ignition	`ignition_gateway_status`	Gateway + module health	R	low	{state, version, modules:[{name, state}]}
Ignition	`ignition_tag_browse`	tag-tree browse	R	low	{tags[], tree{}}
Ignition	`ignition_tag_read`	current tag values	R	low	{values:[{path, value, quality, timestamp}]}
Ignition	`ignition_alarm_status`	active alarms	R	low	{alarm_count, alarms:[{path, priority, state}]}
Ignition	`ignition_tag_history`	tag-history query (bounded)	R	low	{rows:[{path, timestamp, value}]}
信创 / compliance	`compliance_mapping`	《工控网络安全防护指南》↔ iaiops	R	low	{pillars[], status_summary, controls:[{pillar, status, gap}]}
信创 / compliance	`compliance_frameworks`	等保 2.0 + IEC 62443 FR1–6 crosswalk	R	low	{controls:[{crosswalk}]}
信创 / compliance	`compliance_dengbao_levels`	等保二级 baseline vs 三级增量	R	low	{pillars:[{l2, l3_delta, status}]}
信创 / compliance	`compliance_report`	deliverable compliance report (md/html)	R	low	{markdown \| out_path}
信创 / compliance	`compliance_evidence_bundle`	audit-evidence zip (hash-chain verified)	R	low	{bundle_path, manifest}
信创 / historian	`historian_push`	push telemetry to sqlite/TDengine/IoTDB	R(→historian)	low	{sink, received, written, skipped_non_numeric}
Self	`protocols_supported`	capability map	R	low	{protocols[], diagnostics[], analytics[]}

(The energy protocols — IEC-104 / DNP3 / IEC-61850 — moved to iaiops-energy in 0.8.0; their tool matrix lives in that repo.)

196 governed tools = 183 read + 10 MOC-gated device writes + historian_push (a write, to a historian rather than to a device: [WRITE][risk=low]) + the 2 deprecated aliases below. The device writes are (s7_write_db, mc_write_words, fins_write_words, mqtt_publish, eip_write_tag, ethercat_write_sdo, ethercat_set_state, profinet_dcp_set, bacnet_write_property, bas_command). The read side now includes two vendor-REST read-only layers above the field protocols — a BAS controller layer (Metasys/Niagara, building edition) and an Ignition Gateway MES/SCADA layer (factory edition). ¹ The 2 deprecated aliases are the two deprecated brain aliases health_summary / anomaly_scan, renamed to opcua_health_summary / opcua_anomaly_scan in 0.10.0 — the deprecated aliases are still registered and will be removed in a future release (target: 1.0.0). Read-only per-edition tools load ONLY under their edition (see per-edition tool modules below), so a bare protocol / single-edition surface is smaller than this line-wide total. The table above is representative, not exhaustive; run protocols_supported() (or iaiops protocols) for the live map.

Per-protocol reference

OPC-UA

Versions/variants: binary opc.tcp:// via asyncua (sync facade). Security: anonymous + username/password, plus application-certificate message security (Sign / SignAndEncrypt) — set client_cert + client_key (+ optional server_cert) and the client opens a signed/encrypted secure channel (no cert ⇒ the anonymous / username path is unchanged). Validated end-to-end against an in-process asyncua server (tests/test_opcua_security.py) for Basic256Sha256 in both Sign and SignAndEncrypt modes: server_cert pinning and client-side server-cert auto-discovery are exercised, and the test asserts the negotiated policy URI + message-security mode on the live encrypted channel (plus a negative test that anonymous is refused by a secure-only server).
Connection params: endpoint_url, username (password encrypted), security_mode, security_policy; for cert security client_cert / client_key / optional server_cert (PEM or DER paths; aliases certfile / keyfile).
Alarms & Conditions: opcua_alarm_events — bounded event subscription + ConditionRefresh, events carry the server's own timestamps (verified against an in-process asyncua server; third-party A&C servers 待核实). Untimed fallback: opcua_read_alarms browses alarm-like boolean nodes.
Not supported / planned (待核实): cert-security interop with third-party / vendor servers (KEPServerEX / Prosys / Siemens / real PLCs), the other policies (Aes128Sha256RsaOaep / Aes256Sha256RsaPss / Basic128Rsa15 / Basic256), strict server-side certificate-trust enforcement, and cert-based user identity (X509 identity token, distinct from channel security).

Modbus-TCP / Modbus-RTU

Versions/variants: Modbus-TCP and Modbus-RTU (serial RS-485/232) via pymodbus (+ pyserial). Read function codes FC01 (coils), FC02 (discrete), FC03 (holding), FC04 (input). Write FCs (FC05/06/15/16) = not implemented (read-only).
Connection params: TCP — host, port (502), unit_id. RTU — transport: rtu, serial_port (e.g. /dev/ttyUSB0), baudrate, unit_id. Registers are untyped 16-bit words → decode hint (uint16/int16/uint32/int32/float32/raw); modbus_detect_byte_order auto-detects the byte/word order (AB/BA · ABCD/DCBA/BADC/CDAB) from hint values — pure logic, no extra device load.
Vendor register templates (modbus_list_templates / modbus_apply_template): named register maps decoding a block into engineering values — energy meters (Eastron SDM630, Schneider PM5xxx, Carlo Gavazzi EM24), PV inverters (Huawei SUN2000, Growatt), Phoenix PLCnext process data, and water-industry templates (E+H Promag, Hach SC controller, generic dosing pump). Each template carries an explicit 待核实 caveat — no invented "verified" addresses.
Coverage: many domestic 国产 PLCs (汇川 Inovance / 信捷 Xinje / 和利时 Hollysys / 台达 Delta) and any Modbus vendor. RTU framing is live-verified over a real serial link (socat PTY + pymodbus RTU server); specific physical RS-485 devices stay 待核实.

S7comm (Siemens + 仿西门子国产)

Versions/variants: pyS7 (pure-Python, ISO-on-TCP / RFC1006 — no native libsnap7). S7-300/400/1200/1500 and compatible clones. Memory areas DB / M (merker) / I / Q. No protocol auth (CPU gates via "Permit access with PUT/GET").
Connection params: host, port (102), rack, slot (0/1 for 1200/1500; 0/2 common for 300/400).
Write: s7_write_db = high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, captures BEFORE value + undo.
Not supported / planned: optimized/symbolic DB access on 1500 with "optimized block access" can require absolute-addressing config on the CPU.

Mitsubishi MC

Versions/variants: pymcprotocol — MC 3E frame (binary) only. 1E / 4E frames = not supported. PLC types Q / L / QnA / iQ-R / iQ-L. Devices: D/W/R (word), M/X/Y/B (bit).
Connection params: host, port (5007 default; set to the module's open MC port), plctype.
Write: mc_write_words = high/MOC/dry-run default, captures BEFORE + undo.

Omron FINS (CS/CJ/CP/NX-via-FINS)

Versions/variants: in-repo, stdlib-only FINS client (no third-party dependency — the iaiops[fins] extra pins nothing): 10-byte FINS header framing, FINS/UDP (default port 9600) and FINS/TCP (node-address handshake per Omron W342), SID matching, bounded response parsing, end-code table per W227/W342. Commands: 0101 memory-area read (words/bits over DM/CIO/W/H/A/EM), 0102 write, 0501 controller data read, 0601 controller status.
Connection params: host, port (9600), transport (udp default / tcp), FINS network/node/unit addressing.
Write: fins_write_words = high/MOC/dry-run default, captures BEFORE + undo; CLI double-confirm on --apply.
Validation: verified against an in-repo mock FINS UDP/TCP responder (tests/test_fins.py); live Omron PLC behaviour and banked-EM access stay 待核实.

IO-Link (master JSON integration — read-only)

Versions/variants: sensor-level visibility via the IO-Link master's HTTP/JSON interface (IO-Link consortium "JSON Integration"), both dialects selectable per endpoint via flavor: — iotcore (ifm IoT-Core POST envelope, default) and rest (plain-REST GET, Balluff/Turck-style). Reads: master identity, bounded ≤32-port sweep, per-port device identity, process-data-in (raw hex + bytes), ISDU acyclic parameter read. NO write tools. Bounded/size-capped HTTP (256 KiB response cap), schema-checked JSON with teaching errors. Reuses the MTConnect HTTP pin (iaiops[iolink] → requests).
Connection params: master host/URL, flavor, timeout_s. protocol: iolink.
Validation: in-process mock master in both flavors (tests/test_iolink.py); live master datapoint paths stay 待核实.

HART-IP (process instrumentation — read-only)

Versions/variants: HART universal commands over HART-IP UDP (default, port 5094) or TCP (transport: tcp, length-delimited framing) via an in-tree transport; the HART command codec is verified vs hart-protocol. Tools: hart_device_identity (cmd 0), hart_primary_variable (cmd 1), hart_dynamic_variables (cmd 3, PV/SV/TV/QV + loop current), hart_burst_sample (bounded sampling of burst-published variables). No write / device-specific commands exposed (OT-dangerous on live instruments).
Connection params: host (HART-IP server/gateway), port (5094), transport (udp default / tcp).
Validation: TCP transport loopback-verified (in-process HART-IP server, real long-frame ACK through the real codec path); live gateway behaviour and a true unsolicited burst subscription stay 待核实.

MTConnect (ALL CNC machine tools)

Versions/variants: agent REST + XML (requests + xml.etree), namespace-agnostic (parses MTConnect 1.x Devices/Streams/Assets schemas). Endpoints: /probe, /current, /sample, /assets. Read-only by specification. XML parsing is hardened (DTD/entity declarations rejected — XXE/billion-laughs defense).
Connection params: agent_url (e.g. http://host:5000).
Not supported / planned: MTConnect streaming (long-poll interval=); only bounded count= samples.

MQTT / Sparkplug B / UNS

Versions/variants: paho-mqtt — MQTT 3.1.1 & 5. Sparkplug B topic convention spBv1.0/{group}/{type}/{edge}/[device] (NBIRTH/DBIRTH/NDATA/DDATA/NDEATH/DDEATH/STATE). TLS + username/password supported.
Full Sparkplug B decode (no optional extra): payloads are protobuf-decoded with a vendored, byte-for-byte copy of the official Eclipse Tahu sparkplug_b.proto generated module (depends only on protobuf). Per metric you get name, alias (resolved to its name via the BIRTH model), datatype (Int8…Int64/UInt…/Float/Double/Boolean/String/DateTime/Text/UUID/DataSet/Bytes/File/Template/PropertySet…), value, timestamp, and the is_historical / is_null flags. A birth/death + seq model tracks node/device online state (NBIRTH/DBIRTH ↔ NDEATH/DDEATH), builds the alias→name map from BIRTH, applies NDATA/DDATA by alias, and flags seq gaps / out-of-order. Primary-host awareness: STATE/<host_id> topics surface in sparkplug_node_list. sparkplug_decode_payload decodes a single raw payload (base64/hex) offline.
A data SOURCE, not just a bus (new): MQTT/Sparkplug is collectable — iaiops collect run holds ONE subscription open for the run and samples from its last-value cache, so a plant whose data is already unified into a UNS can be tapped without touching a PLC. Refusals are the feature. MQTT is pushed, and the obvious cache answers with the last value forever after a publisher dies — availability then reads 100% on a stopped line, in every subscriber at once. So a point is a reading only when it has been seen at all (never-published is not zero), is fresher than stale_after_s, and — for Sparkplug — its node has not sent NDEATH/DDEATH. Anything else raises OTNoReadingError, which the collector records as a gap (collection was blind), never as downtime.
stale_after_s is REQUIRED to collect, and deliberately has no default: a value that stopped updating and one that is simply constant are identical on the wire, so only the site knows how often a point is published. Guessing it here would put a guess underneath every availability figure. Same discipline as running_when on a run_state tag.
The two guarantees are not equal, and the endpoint is told which it has: Sparkplug gives staleness and death (the broker publishes the node's Last Will); plain MQTT has no death signal at all, so only staleness is available there and a quiet topic is indistinguishable from a dead publisher.
Refs: a plain-MQTT ref is the topic itself; a Sparkplug ref is group/edge[/device]:metric — exactly the node id mqtt live-schema reports, so its output is usable as config refs without translation. Payloads decode as a bare scalar or a {"value": …} / {"v": …} JSON envelope; an unknown envelope is not guessed at by picking its only number.
Connection params: host/broker, port (1883 / 8883 TLS), topic, use_tls, username (password encrypted), stale_after_s (required for collection).
Validation: verified end-to-end against a real eclipse-mosquitto:2 broker through the full paho loop (tests/test_uns_tap_live.py, opt-in) — publish → read → publisher stops → the run records a gap instead of repeating the cache. Also exercised across a real network on three separate hosts (broker, edge node, reader) against a spec-correct Sparkplug node — alias-only NDATA, periodic re-BIRTH, and a genuine broker-issued Last Will after the publisher was kill -9'd on another machine (refusal in ~2s with stale_after_s deliberately set to 60, so only the death signal could have caused it). 待核实: the edge node is still our own implementation, not a commercial EoN (Ignition / Litmus / HighByte), and not a commercial broker (HiveMQ / EMQX).
Command: mqtt_publish = high/MOC/dry-run default. A transient publish has no automatic inverse (delivered is delivered); a retained one overwrites durable broker state, so it captures the prior retained payload and records an inverse.

EtherNet/IP (Rockwell / Allen-Bradley)

Supported: ControlLogix / CompactLogix (and GuardLogix) via CIP / EtherNet-IP using pycomm3 (pure-Python — no native deps). Tag-based, symbolic access: read/write tags by name (Conveyor.Speed, Array[3], Program:Main.X) and discover the controller's tag list at runtime (eip_list_tags, the headline feature). eip_controller_info reads the controller identity.
Connection params: host, slot (0 for CompactLogix; the CPU slot for a ControlLogix chassis), port (44818). protocol: ethernetip (alias eip).
Write: eip_write_tag = high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, captures BEFORE value + undo.
Not supported / planned: PLC-5 / SLC-500 (PCCC) and Micro800 are not supported = roadmap (Logix tag model only).

EtherCAT (pysoem / SOEM fieldbus master)

Supported: a real EtherCAT master via pysoem (the Python binding for the SOEM C stack). CoE SDO read (ethercat_read_sdo, acyclic mailbox upload) + SDO write (ethercat_write_sdo, download), input PDO read (ethercat_read_pdo, one bounded cyclic snapshot), bus scan / slave enumeration (ethercat_slaves, ethercat_slave_info — identity, SM/FMMU mapping, object-dictionary summary), master/working-counter state (ethercat_master_state), and AL-state transitions INIT↔PREOP↔SAFEOP↔OP (ethercat_set_state).
HARD REQUIREMENTS (no way around them): Linux, root or CAP_NET_RAW, a dedicated NIC cabled to the bus, and real EtherCAT slave hardware. pysoem is an OPTIONAL extra: pip install iaiops[ethercat] — the base package installs and imports without it, and every EtherCAT tool then degrades to a teaching error (never crashes, never imports pysoem at module load).
NOT supported: no software simulator exists (unlike OPC-UA / Modbus) — EtherCAT is hardware-only and not testable in mock-only CI; macOS is unsupported. EoE / FoE / SoE mailbox protocols and full PDO-mapping decode/expansion = roadmap.
Connection params: nic (the dedicated interface name, e.g. eth1; alias interface), optional expected_slaves (a sanity check vs the bus scan). protocol: ethercat.

Operations matrix:

Tool	Op	R/W	risk	Capture/notes
`ethercat_master_state`	master + WKC state, slave count	R	low	expected vs found
`ethercat_slaves`	bus scan / enumerate	R	low	index/vendor/product/rev/addr/AL-state
`ethercat_slave_info`	one-slave detail	R	low	SM/FMMU + OD summary
`ethercat_read_sdo`	CoE SDO upload	R	low	hex + uint interpretation
`ethercat_read_pdo`	input PDO snapshot	R	low	single cycle, never loops
`ethercat_write_sdo`	CoE SDO download	W	high/MOC	before-value (SDO read-back) + undo
`ethercat_set_state`	AL-state transition	W	high/MOC	before-state + undo; can start/stop motion

Write/state safety: ethercat_write_sdo (hex little-endian bytes) and ethercat_set_state are high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run by default, capture the BEFORE value/state for undo, and need a CLI double-confirm. Changing EtherCAT state can START or STOP machine motion — treat with extreme care. 未经授权勿对生产控制系统写入.

PROFINET (DCP discovery / identify + gated DCP Set)

Supported: layer-2 PROFINET-DCP via pnio-dcp — profinet_discover (DCP IdentifyAll: one broadcast surfaces every station on the segment — name-of-station, MAC, IP, vendor/device id, role — closer to passive discovery than a per-device fingerprint), profinet_identify_station (by name-of-station), profinet_station_params (targeted DCP Get by MAC → name + IP suite), and profinet_asset_inventory (a register with IO-controller vs IO-device role decoding).
Write: profinet_dcp_set re-addresses one station (name-of-station and/or IP suite, by MAC) — high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, captures the BEFORE addressing + undo descriptor. Re-addressing a live station can disrupt its IO connection.
Scope (deliberate): no RT cyclic process data (that needs an IO-controller/IO-device stack and hard real-time — out of scope and unsafe to tap); the blink / factory-reset DCP services stay unexposed.
HARD REQUIREMENTS: raw-socket access (root / admin / CAP_NET_RAW) on the NIC on the PROFINET subnet. pnio-dcp is an OPTIONAL extra: pip install iaiops[profinet] — the base package installs/imports without it, and every tool then degrades to a teaching error.
Connection params: host — THIS machine's IP on the PROFINET subnet (the DCP broadcast goes out on it). protocol: profinet.
Preview caveat: validated against a mocked pnio-dcp DCP — not verified against live PROFINET devices yet.

Energy edition (electrical substation / utility telecontrol) → `iaiops-energy`

The energy vertical — IEC 60870-5-104 / DNP3 / IEC 61850 MMS read-only monitoring for substation RTUs/IEDs — moved to its own package in 0.8.0: iaiops-energy (pip install iaiops-energy), built on iaiops.core (shared governance / brain / runtime). Its protocol reference, support matrix, and validation status live in that repo.

Building edition (facility / HVAC / 厂务)

The building vertical adds BACnet/IP (ASHRAE 135) — the dominant building-automation protocol for HVAC, lighting, metering, and facility plant. Install with pip install iaiops[building] and expose with IAIOPS_MCP=building (bundle: bacnet + modbus + opcua + iolink).

BACnet/IP (BAC0 over bacpypes3): bacnet_discover (Who-Is device discovery), bacnet_object_list (a device's objects), bacnet_read_property (one object property), bacnet_read_points (present-value of all analog/binary/multistate points — the HVAC snapshot), bacnet_cov_subscribe (bounded change-of-value capture — capped by count AND wall-clock, always unsubscribes), bacnet_read_trend_log (TrendLog buffered records via one bounded readRange). Config: host = THIS machine's BACnet/IP interface (ip or ip/mask) / port (47808).
Write: bacnet_write_property (present-value at a BACnet priority 1..16, or relinquish) = high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, BEFORE-value read-back + undo. Overriding a live building-control point can move real HVAC/plant.
Validation: the read path is verified against a real bacpypes3 virtual BACnet/IP device through the actual async BAC0 stack (tests/test_bacnet_live.py); COV / trend-log / writes on live HVAC gear stay 待核实.

Water treatment edition (水处理)

IAIOPS_MCP=water (or iaiops-mcp-water, pip install iaiops[water]) exposes modbus + opcua + hart + the brain — the protocol set waterworks / wastewater plants actually run. Adds water-domain tag semantics (溶解氧 DO / ORP / 余氯 chlorine / 氨氮 ammonia / TSS/MLSS / 跨膜压差 TMP / UV / 加药 dosing / 曝气 aeration) and water-industry Modbus templates (E+H Promag, Hach SC controller, generic dosing pump — all with explicit 待核实 caveats).

Warehouse / intralogistics edition (仓储 / 物料搬运)

IAIOPS_MCP=warehouse (or iaiops-mcp-warehouse, pip install iaiops[warehouse]) exposes eip + profinet + modbus + opcua + sparkplug + the brain — conveyor & sorter drives over EtherNet/IP (Rockwell) and Profinet (Siemens), VFD / energy meters over Modbus (conveyor_vfd / agv_battery templates), WMS/WCS gateways over OPC-UA, and AMR/IoT telemetry over MQTT-Sparkplug. Edition tools (read-only, advisory): line_bottleneck (Theory-of-Constraints throughput bottleneck across stations) + sortation_health. PdM (pdm_forecast), downtime_triage and OEE are reused as-is.

Clinical-facility edition (医疗设施)

IAIOPS_MCP=clinical (or iaiops-mcp-clinical, pip install iaiops[clinical]) exposes bacnet + modbus + opcua + the brain — hospital facilities as a distinct patient-safety vertical over the building brain. Edition tools (read-only, advisory): isolation_room_check (负压/正压 isolation-room pressurization), medical_gas_check (medical-gas alarm-panel safety), or_environment_check (OR temperature / humidity / pressure envelope). BACnet BMS + Modbus gas-alarm panels + OPC-UA plant SCADA.

Pharmaceutical-manufacturing edition (制药)

IAIOPS_MCP=pharma (or iaiops-mcp-pharma, pip install iaiops[pharma]) exposes bacnet + modbus + hart + opcua + the brain. No new protocol — that is the point: no field protocol is specific to pharma. Cleanrooms run BACnet, purified-water systems run Modbus and HART, filling and lyophilization run S7, DCS and bioreactors run OPC-UA, and all of it was already here. What pharma needed was semantics: the water edition's indicators are municipal (DO, ORP, chlorine, turbidity) and the clinical edition grades one room's pressure, where Annex 1 inspects the cascade.

Edition tools (read-only, advisory): cleanroom_pressure_cascade (EU GMP Annex 1, door by door — adjacency is declared, never inferred from a room list), cleanroom_particle_check, pharma_water_check (USP <645> stage-1 procedure: the non-temperature-compensated reading, the measured temperature rounded down to the tabulated step, and exceeding stage 1 reported as proceed to Stage 2 rather than as a failure).

No compendial limit tables are shipped. The particle limits, the stage-1 conductivity table and the TOC limit belong to the site's qualified specification at its compendial revision. A transcription nobody in this repository can verify would end up deciding whether a batch environment passed — and the error that hurts is the flattering one, since a limit set too loose reads as "in specification". Limits are passed in and cited back; anything not declared is reported no_limit / not_graded and named, never counted as passing. Known gaps are listed in the edition's skill: no PI historian connector, S7 without hardware verification, no GxP (Annex 11 / Part 11) crosswalk yet, and LIMS / QMS deliberately out of scope — they run REST and databases, not field protocols.

Renewables edition (光伏 / 风电)

IAIOPS_MCP=renewables (or iaiops-mcp-renewables, pip install iaiops[renewables]) exposes modbus + opcua + sparkplug + the brain — PV inverters (SUN2000 / Growatt templates) + wind-turbine controllers over Modbus, OPC-UA plant SCADA, and MQTT-Sparkplug telemetry. Edition tool (read-only, advisory): pv_performance (PV string performance vs expectation). Device-level monitoring + PdM via baseline / RCA.

PLCnext packaging edition (Phoenix Contact vPLC)

IAIOPS_MCP=plcnext (or iaiops-mcp-plcnext, pip install iaiops[plcnext]) exposes opcua + modbus + the brain — the Phoenix Contact PLCnext virtualized PLC reached over its built-in OPC-UA server (opc.tcp 4840, Arp.Plc.Eclr address space) + Modbus-TCP process-data server; no new connector. Route-verified in-process; live PLCnext hardware reads stay 待核实 (see How far it's actually been verified).

信创 / China entry (offline · 国产 TSDB · compliance)

For 自主可控 / 信创 deployments — see docs/CHINA.md for the full guide.

Air-gapped install: pure-Python core + per-protocol optional extras → install from a local wheelhouse with pip install --no-index --find-links ./wheelhouse "iaiops[...]"; secrets stay local (encrypted store), no cloud KMS.
National TSDB historian sink (historian_push, CLI iaiops historian push): write collected telemetry to TDengine (iaiops[tdengine]) or Apache IoTDB (iaiops[iotdb]) — domestic, controllable; we don't build our own store or bind InfluxDB. Data egress to the operator's own historian, not a control write.
Compliance mapping (compliance_mapping, CLI iaiops compliance): an honest 《工控系统网络安全防护指南》 ↔ iaiops self-assessment across 分区隔离 / 可审计 / 双向认证 / 最小权限 / 数据保护 / 自主可控, with per-control status (addressed / partial / 待核实) and the named gap.
国产 PLC: 汇川 / 台达 / 信捷 over the existing Modbus-TCP / S7 connectors.
⚠️ 待核实: 国产 OS (麒麟/统信) · 芯 (鲲鹏/海光) · PLC validation and the TSDB write paths are documented but not yet hardware-verified — see the validation matrix in docs/CHINA.md.

OEE / downtime analytics (cross-protocol, read-only)

oee_compute — OEE = Availability × Performance × Quality from production inputs (planned time, run time, ideal cycle, total/good counts). Each factor is reported raw + clamped to [0,1]; a capped performance >1.0 flags an optimistic ideal cycle.
downtime_events — auto-detects running→stopped transitions in a {timestamp, state} series and produces stoppage events with durations, categorized (changeover / material / mechanical / quality / break / unknown, by keyword heuristics or a {state: category} override).
oee_multidim — aggregates OEE across machine × part × shift (or any dimensions) from labelled records → the matrix + worst performers.
Operate over provided/collected inputs (fully testable without a plant). mtconnect_oee_snapshot surfaces the live MTConnect availability/execution inputs that feed these.

Active asset inventory / fingerprint (read-only)

asset_inventory — for each configured (or named) endpoint, actively connects with our own protocol client and reads its identity call (S7 s7_cpu_info, EtherNet/IP eip_controller_info, OPC-UA server build info, Modbus Device Identification FC43/0x2B, Mitsubishi CPU type, MTConnect device model), aggregating vendor / model / firmware / serial / reachable / last_seen into an asset register.
Honest scope (IEC 62443-flavored): this is ACTIVE fingerprinting via our client connections, NOT passive SPAN/tap discovery — it only finds devices we are configured to reach and adds light load to each. Passive, traffic-mirroring discovery is roadmap.

OPC-UA Historical Access (HDA)

opcua_read_history — reads stored historical values for a node over a [start,end] ISO-8601 window via the server's HistoryRead service (asyncua read_raw_history), bounded by max_points (≤2000). Returns {supported:false, note} gracefully when the server does not historize the node (no crash). Read-only.

Change-of-value (CoV) monitor

monitor_changes — bounded deadband report: polls a point and returns only the value CHANGES (with timestamps), not every sample. Works over OPC-UA / Modbus / S7 / Mitsubishi MC / EtherNet-IP. Never an infinite loop — hard-capped by both duration_s (≤120) and max_changes (≤500). Read-only.

Cross-protocol brain — 0.9/0.10 additions (all read-only)

Conservative baseline learning (baseline_learn/check/record_change/status, CLI iaiops baseline …) — a change-log baseline, explicitly NOT black-box anomaly detection: robust p1/p99 + median/MAD band over the local history, refuses thin history (<100 samples or <24h) with an explicit insufficient_data verdict, restarts at recorded operator changes, and is silent by default — a violation needs >3×MAD beyond the band AND ≥3 consecutive samples, and every violation cites its baseline window and offending samples.
Historian READ integration (historian_query / historian_coverage, CLI iaiops historian query|coverage) — query history back out of the sqlite/TDengine/IoTDB sinks; an optional per-site historian: config block lets the RCA copilot pull the 2h pre-incident window as one more cited evidence class (strictly additive — without the config, RCA output is byte-identical, test-proven).
Legacy PLC program explainer (plc_program_outline/xref/section, CLI iaiops program …) — structural extraction over exported program files (Siemens SCL/ST .scl/.st, AWL/STL .awl, Rockwell Studio 5000 .L5X — never a live PLC upload); every element carries source_file + line (rung for L5X) so the explaining agent must cite real locations. XXE-hardened, ≤5 MB, extension allowlist.
ISA-18.2 alarm flood deep-dive (alarm_flood_analysis / alarm_rationalization_worksheet, CLI iaiops diag alarm-flood|alarm-worksheet) — flood episodes (≥10 alarms/10 min), chattering, stale/standing (>24h), percent-time-in-flood vs target, and a CSV-exportable rationalization worksheet; over injected events or a live OPC-UA active-condition scan.
Open-format export + metrics bridge — iaiops export csv|sqlite|parquet (from the local SQLite sink; Parquet via iaiops[export]) / MCP export_data; iaiops metrics serve --port 9184 exposes Prometheus /metrics (latest tag values + counters, binds 127.0.0.1 by default) — Grafana recipe in docs/GRAFANA.md.
Compliance deliverables — iaiops compliance report (等保 2.0 L2/L3 status + IEC 62443 FR1–6 crosswalk + honest gap list, md/html) and iaiops compliance evidence (audit-evidence zip with hash-chain verification + manifest); MCP compliance_report / compliance_evidence_bundle. Onboarding aids, 非认证.

Cross-protocol brain & editions — 0.11/0.12 additions (all read-only)

Downtime triage copilot (downtime_triage) — composes alarm cascade + RCA verdict + PdM precursors into one triage and cross-checks whether the first-out alarm agrees with the diagnosed cause; advisory, cite-first (builds on the earlier alarm_cascade first-out reconstruction and pdm_forecast time-to-threshold early-warning).
Legacy-PLC maintainability (plc_program_visibility) — a risk/maintainability read over an exported ST/AWL/L5X program (size, block count, xref density, undocumented sections), never a live upload — pairs with the plc_program_outline/xref/section explainer.
Per-edition tool modules (EDITION_MODULES in mcp_server/profiles.py) — a named edition can carry its own @mcp.tool group that loads only when that edition is selected — never for a bare protocol key and never in the always-on brain, so edition-specific tools stay off other surfaces and don't inflate the base. Every edition tool is read-only, cite-first, advisory:
- warehouse — line_bottleneck (Theory-of-Constraints throughput bottleneck) + sortation_health
- clinical — isolation_room_check (负压隔离病房 pressurization) + medical_gas_check + or_environment_check
- building — economizer_check (AHU economizer FDD) + zone_comfort
- process — control_loop_health (PID oscillation/offset/saturation) + heat_exchanger_fouling
- fab — spc_check (SPC control-chart rules) + defect_pareto
- factory — changeover_analysis (SMED)
- water — disinfection_ct + water_quality_compliance
- renewables — pv_performance (PV string performance)
Agent skills — the repo ships a router skill (skills/iaiops) plus ten per-edition skills (iaiops-fab / iaiops-factory / iaiops-process / iaiops-building / iaiops-water / iaiops-warehouse / iaiops-clinical / iaiops-pharma / iaiops-renewables / iaiops-plcnext) that route an agent to the right MCP server and document the tool surface.

Deployment & ecosystem fit (edge-native / Margo)

iaiops is designed to ride on a hardened, centrally-managed edge host as a portable, governed edge application — not to own the host or the fleet manager. It maps naturally onto the Margo edge-interoperability roles: the host/device is the immutable edge OS, a compliant orchestrator places workloads by desired-state, and iaiops is the OT-domain application — read-first tap + cross-protocol RCA, exposed as governed MCP tools, with an optional on-box LLM brain for a fully air-gapped diagnostic path (data never leaves the plant).

Honest status: iaiops is a natural Margo edge application but is NOT Margo-compliant yet — a container image + application description + a published conformance-toolkit result are roadmap ⏳ (see docs/MARGO-ALIGNMENT.md and docs/ROADMAP.md). No material claims Margo-compliant until that test result exists.

A container + application-description skeleton lives in deploy/margo/ (hardened Dockerfile · compose · 待核实-marked app descriptor); per-host distribution overlays that reuse it live under deploy/ (one folder per candidate edge host).

Install

Protocol client libraries are optional extras — install only the 1–2 protocols a site actually runs (every protocol library is imported lazily; the base package installs and imports without any of them, and a call to a not-installed protocol returns a teaching error pointing at the right extra):

bash

uv tool install "iaiops[opcua,modbus]"   # just the protocols you need
# or one per site:  pip install "iaiops[s7]"   ·   everything:  pip install "iaiops[all]"
# or a per-industry edition bundle:        pip install "iaiops[fab]"

iaiops init                 # interactive: add endpoints, store passwords encrypted
iaiops doctor               # config + per-protocol connectivity probe (point at simulators)
iaiops protocols            # the capability map

Protocol extras: opcua · modbus · s7 · mc · fins (stdlib — pins nothing) · eip · mtconnect · sparkplug · secsgem · ethercat · profinet · bacnet · hart · iolink · bas (BAS supervisory REST — reuses the mtconnect HTTP pin) · ignition (Ignition Gateway read layer — reuses the mtconnect HTTP pin) · plus tdengine · iotdb · influxdb (historian sinks) · nats (stream egress) · ollama (on-box LLM narration) · export (Parquet) · all (every pip-installable connector).

Adapter belt (docs/ADAPTERS.md): iaiops is a small neutral core (ingress → normalize/govern/RCA → egress) with pluggable, lazily-imported adapters — bind no store/bus/host/model, install only what a site runs. The RCA core is deterministic + cited, not a black box (docs/RCA.md); footprint is small by design (docs/FOOTPRINT.md).

Edition bundles (match the same-named IAIOPS_MCP profiles — install the protocols a vertical runs): fab (secsgem + opcua + s7 + modbus) · factory (the discrete-manufacturing set: opcua + modbus + s7 + mc + fins + eip + mtconnect + sparkplug + ethercat + profinet + iolink + ignition) · process (opcua + modbus + hart) · building (bacnet + modbus + opcua + iolink + bas) · water (modbus + opcua + hart) · warehouse (仓储/物料搬运: eip + profinet + modbus + opcua + sparkplug) · clinical (医疗设施: bacnet + modbus + opcua) · renewables (光伏/风电: modbus + opcua + sparkplug — PV inverters (SUN2000/Growatt) + wind turbines + plant SCADA; device-level monitoring + PdM via baseline/RCA) · plcnext (opcua + modbus). The grid/substation energy bundle (IEC-104/DNP3/61850) ships in iaiops-energy.

Master password

Secrets (per-endpoint passwords, MQTT credentials) are never stored in plaintext — they live in ~/.iaiops/secrets.enc (Fernet + scrypt). Export IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD so the MCP server/CLI can unlock non-interactively:

bash

export IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD='…'

Example `~/.iaiops/config.yaml` (one block per protocol)

yaml

endpoints:
  - name: line1
    protocol: opcua
    endpoint_url: opc.tcp://plc.lan:4840
    # username: operator           # password stored encrypted via init/secret set
    tags:
      - { ref: "ns=2;i=5", label: temp, warn_high: 70, alarm_high: 90 }
  - name: plc2
    protocol: modbus
    host: 10.0.0.5
    port: 502
    unit_id: 1
  - name: press1
    protocol: s7
    host: 10.0.0.6
    rack: 0
    slot: 1                        # S7-1200/1500
  - name: cell3
    protocol: mc
    host: 10.0.0.7
    port: 5007
    plctype: iQ-R
  - name: meter1
    protocol: modbus                 # Modbus-RTU (serial): set transport + serial_port
    transport: rtu
    serial_port: /dev/ttyUSB0
    baudrate: 9600
    unit_id: 1
  - name: omron1
    protocol: fins                   # Omron FINS (UDP default; transport: tcp for FINS/TCP)
    host: 10.0.0.11
    port: 9600
  - name: xmtr1
    protocol: hart                   # HART-IP gateway (read-only; udp default / transport: tcp)
    host: 10.0.0.20
  - name: iolm1
    protocol: iolink                 # IO-Link master JSON integration (read-only)
    host: 10.0.0.21
    flavor: iotcore                  # ifm IoT-Core (default) | rest (Balluff/Turck-style)
  - name: vmc1
    protocol: mtconnect
    agent_url: http://10.0.0.8:5000
  - name: uns
    protocol: mqtt
    host: broker.lan
    use_tls: true                  # → port 8883
    topic: spBv1.0/#
    # username: edge1              # password stored encrypted
  - name: cell5
    protocol: ethernetip           # alias: eip
    host: 10.0.0.9
    slot: 0                        # 0 for CompactLogix; CPU slot for ControlLogix
  - name: bus1
    protocol: ethercat             # Linux + root/CAP_NET_RAW + pip install iaiops[ethercat]
    nic: eth1                      # dedicated NIC cabled to the EtherCAT bus
    expected_slaves: 8             # optional sanity check vs the bus scan

A key this file does not recognise is refused, not ignored — in an endpoint, in a tag, in historian: and in retention:. A dropped key was indistinguishable from one never written: rolle: good_count declared a production counter as far as the site was concerned, and iaiops readiness then reported the OEE mapping unmet while pointing nowhere near the typo. The error names the key, the accepted set, and the nearest match.

`iaiops init` walkthrough (per protocol)

$ iai

What it does

What it costs

Industrial-AIOps

What you get

Your first five minutes

Why read-first

Proving the analysis needs no model

How far it's actually been verified

🧪 测试与共创 / Beta testing & co-creation

Consolidated capability matrix

Per-protocol reference

OPC-UA

Modbus-TCP / Modbus-RTU

S7comm (Siemens + 仿西门子 国产)

Mitsubishi MC

Omron FINS (CS/CJ/CP/NX-via-FINS)

IO-Link (master JSON integration — read-only)

HART-IP (process instrumentation — read-only)

MTConnect (ALL CNC machine tools)

MQTT / Sparkplug B / UNS

EtherNet/IP (Rockwell / Allen-Bradley)

EtherCAT (pysoem / SOEM fieldbus master)

PROFINET (DCP discovery / identify + gated DCP Set)

Energy edition (electrical substation / utility telecontrol) → iaiops-energy

Building edition (facility / HVAC / 厂务)

Water treatment edition (水处理)

Warehouse / intralogistics edition (仓储 / 物料搬运)

Clinical-facility edition (医疗设施)

Pharmaceutical-manufacturing edition (制药)

Renewables edition (光伏 / 风电)

PLCnext packaging edition (Phoenix Contact vPLC)

信创 / China entry (offline · 国产 TSDB · compliance)

OEE / downtime analytics (cross-protocol, read-only)

Active asset inventory / fingerprint (read-only)

OPC-UA Historical Access (HDA)

Change-of-value (CoV) monitor

Cross-protocol brain — 0.9/0.10 additions (all read-only)

Cross-protocol brain & editions — 0.11/0.12 additions (all read-only)

Deployment & ecosystem fit (edge-native / Margo)

Install

Master password

Example ~/.iaiops/config.yaml (one block per protocol)

iaiops init walkthrough (per protocol)

Similar modules

S7comm (Siemens + 仿西门子国产)

Energy edition (electrical substation / utility telecontrol) → `iaiops-energy`

Example `~/.iaiops/config.yaml` (one block per protocol)

`iaiops init` walkthrough (per protocol)