English | Русский

MikroTik REST MCP

MCP server that gives coding agents structured access to a RouterOS 7 device over its REST API — reads, filtered queries, guarded writes, a scheduled rollback guard, container shell, and file transfer. One MCP server over stdio.

Built for real ops work: the agent can inventory the router, diff firewall/routing state, poke containers, watch counters, and apply changes — with a human confirmation gate in front of anything disruptive.

Features

• Broad read coverage
  • ~60 curated get_* tools for the common collections (firewall, routes, DHCP, DNS, interfaces, WireGuard, containers, scheduler, logs, system resources).
  • 200+ additional get_* endpoints stay callable by name through the same filter pipeline — they are deliberately unlisted so the tool schema stays small. catalog_search makes them discoverable.
  • routeros_get takes any /rest/ path directly, plus routeros_batch for up to 16 parallel reads in one call.
• Real query power
  • Client-side where filters with __contains, __in, __not, __gt, __gte, __lt, __lte, __startswith, __endswith.
  • fields projection, sort_by, limit, compact (one-line-per-item output that saves a lot of tokens).
  • RouterOS-native .proplist / .query pass-through for server-side filtering.
• Guarded mutations
  • MIKROTIK_MODE=readonly: mutation/execution tools are not registered at all — the protocol surface itself is read-only, not just policy-gated.
  • MIKROTIK_MODE=careful (default): operations classified as disruptive return requires_confirmation — the agent relays it to the user and re-runs with confirm: true after approval. MCP elicitation shows a native dialog where supported. The confirmation flag is a UX gate, not a security boundary — the RouterOS account permissions are what actually limits the agent.
  • Method-aware policy: PUT only on known collections, PATCH/DELETE only on collection/<id> items, POST only on an explicit action allowlist (ping, traceroute, fetch, file/read, script/run, dns flush, backup/save, export, container shell — see catalog.py).
  • MIKROTIK_STRICT_CONFIRM=1 gates every mutation.
  • MIKROTIK_MODE=yolo removes all gates and can switch to a separate full-privilege account (MIKROTIK_YOLO_USERNAME / MIKROTIK_YOLO_PASSWORD_FILE) — for supervised automation windows only.
• Scheduled rollback guard (not RouterOS Safe Mode — this works over plain REST)
  • apply_safe snapshots the target, arms an on-router scheduler, then applies the mutation. Once armed, the rollback no longer depends on the MCP process or client staying alive — commit_safe disarms it within window_seconds.
  • Supported methods: PATCH (restores the snapshotted values of changed fields — not transactional, no concurrent-edit detection) and DELETE (best-effort recreate; list position and generated fields are not preserved — the response says so). PUT is rejected because a created item's .id can't be known until after it exists.
  • Ambiguous transport failures leave the rollback armed rather than silently disarming; commit_safe keeps the pending record if disarm fails so it can be retried.
  • safe_status reports currently armed rollbacks.
• Container & diagnostics
  • container_shell runs commands inside RouterOS containers by name or .id — off by default (MIKROTIK_ENABLE_CONTAINER_SHELL), confirmation-gated in careful mode, and the generic routeros_write path can't bypass the flag. timeout_seconds overrides the REST timeout for long-running commands.
  • container_apply_safe / container_commit_safe — transactional shell commands inside containers: snapshots snapshot_paths, runs the mutation, check_cmd rolls back immediately on failure, and a repeating RouterOS-scheduler watchdog restores the snapshot unless committed in time. One active transaction per container.
  • interface_traffic measures live rx/tx bps and pps over a sampling window; routeros_watch diffs numeric fields across samples — counter deltas without two manual reads.
  • run_ping, run_traceroute, run_fetch, run_wifi_monitor, describe_path (field introspection before you write filters).
• File ops with a sandbox
  • Router-side file create/read/update/rename/delete plus chunked download_file / upload_file.
  • Host filesystem access is off by default; MIKROTIK_ENABLE_LOCAL_FILES + MIKROTIK_LOCAL_ROOT confine it to one directory; transfers are capped at 8 MiB and download_file requires overwrite: true to replace an existing local file.
• Secret hygiene
  • Credentials come from MIKROTIK_PASSWORD_FILE (recommended) or MIKROTIK_PASSWORD.
  • Every response passes through a scrubber that masks password/secret/psk/token/private-key-shaped fields (MIKROTIK_REDACT=0 disables). Redaction is field-name based — secrets embedded in free-form text (comments, script bodies, log lines, file contents) are not reliably detected.
  • Tool annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint) on every tool so clients can enforce their own policy.

Requirements

• Python 3.10+ (developed on 3.13).
• RouterOS 7.1+ with REST reachable (integration-tested on 7.24.5, hAP ax³ — REST, containers, scheduler rollback, file ops). HTTPS via www-ssl recommended; plain HTTP via www requires RouterOS 7.9+ and should be used only on isolated networks — REST uses Basic auth, readable on the wire.
• A RouterOS user with read + api + rest-api for read-only use. Add write + test for mutations/diagnostics, ftp for file tools (download_file, /file/read). Script entries have their own policy attribute — the account only needs write to run them, and cannot run a script with broader policy than it possesses.

Installation

pipx install mikrotik-rest-mcp-server   # or: uvx mikrotik-rest-mcp-server

This exposes the mikrotik-rest-mcp-server console script. For development: git clone + pip install -e .

Configuration

Point your MCP client at the server:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mikrotik_rest": {
      "command": "mikrotik-rest-mcp-server",
      "env": {
        "MIKROTIK_BASE": "https://192.168.88.1",
        "MIKROTIK_USERNAME": "mcp-agent",
        "MIKROTIK_PASSWORD_FILE": "/path/to/password-file"
      }
    }
  }
}

See .env.example for the full variable list (modes, capability flags, timeouts, TLS verification).

Recommended RouterOS account

# ops account — reads, config writes, diagnostics; no user/policy management,
# no sensitive fields, no reboot
/user group add name=agent policy=read,write,api,rest-api,test,ftp
/user add name=mcp-agent group=agent password=<random>

# monitoring-only account (pair with MIKROTIK_MODE=readonly)
/user group add name=monitor policy=read,api,rest-api,test

For yolo mode, create a second account in full and wire it via MIKROTIK_YOLO_*. Omit ftp if you don't need file tools.

Using it with agents

Typical flow an agent follows:

get_dhcp_leases {compact: true}                     → quick device list
routeros_batch {requests: [...]}                    → status in one call
describe_path {path: "/rest/interface/ethernet"}    → field names before filtering
interface_traffic {name: "ether1", seconds: 2}      → live throughput
routeros_watch {path: ..., diff: true}              → counter deltas
routeros_write {method: "PATCH", ...}               → routine config edit
routeros_write {method: "DELETE", ...}              → stops for confirmation
apply_safe {method: "PATCH", path: "…/<.id>", window_seconds: 60}
                                                    → rollback armed on router; commit_safe to keep

run_script_inline creates a temporary RouterOS script, runs it, and removes it (always confirmed in careful mode). container_shell and host file transfer need their opt-in flags.

Layout

src/mikrotik_rest_mcp/
  client.py      — REST transport, TLS, env config
  catalog.py     — endpoint/tool tables (pure data)
  policy.py      — risk tiers, confirmation gate, mutation allowlist
  output.py      — secret redaction, filters, compact serialization
  files.py       — local file sandbox + router file helpers
  safe_apply.py  — snapshot/rollback machinery
  server.py      — tool list, dispatch, resources, entrypoint

Tests

pytest tests/

Unit tests run without a router (REST calls are mocked).

Security

See SECURITY.md. Don't point this at routers you don't administer; treat yolo as a loaded gun and container_shell as remote code execution (because it is).